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Abstract
Suppose there is a movie you would be interested in watching via pay-per-view,
but you refuse to purchase the feed because you believe that the supplier will
sell your information to groups paying for the contact information of all the
people who purchased that movie, and the association of your name to that
purchase could hinder career, relationships, or increase the amount of time you
spend cleaning SPAM out of your mailbox. Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
will allow you to retrieve a particular feed without the supplier knowing which
feed you actually got, and Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) will
assure the supplier, if the feeds are equally priced, that you received only the
number of feeds you purchased. Now you can purchase without risking your
name being associated with a particular feed and the supplier has gained the
business of a once paranoid client.
The problem of SPIR can be achieved with the cryptographic primitive
Oblivious Transfer (OT). Several approaches to constructing such protocols
have been posed and proven to be secure. Most attempts have aimed at re-
ducing the amount of communication, theoretically, but this thesis compares
the computational expense of the algorithms through experimentation to show
that reduction of communication is less valuable in the effort of achieving a prac-
tical protocol than reducing the amount of computation. Further, this thesis
introduces new protocols to compete with previous published protocols that de-
rive security from additive homomorphic probabilistic encryption schemes, and
explores means to increase the length of data handled by these protocols so that
the media is more useful and the time to complete the protocol is reasonable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There exist many databases, both public and private, and there exist several
users that may be hesitant to obtain information from these sources for various
reasons involving the preservation of the client’s privacy. The server’s knowledge
of the data retrieved by the client could be used in a malicious manner such as
unwanted profiling, spying, or blackmail. If the database is public, then a Pri-
vate Information Retrieval Protocol (PIR) could be used to maintain the client’s
privacy. Private information retrieval is oblivious transfer with the privacy of
the server removed and is generally addressed in a more practical setting.
Definition 1.0.1 (Private Information Retrieval [CKGS98]) A scheme
with a protocol which satisfies the following properties
Inputs Client i∗ the desired index
Server x the server-side database
Outputs Client xi∗ the entry in the server-side
database at the desired index
Server Nothing
Privacy Client Received entry unknown to the server
Server No privacy
Since the server has no privacy to maintain, the trivial solution is for the client
to download the entire database and then read the desired entries. Thus, the
goal of private information retrieval research is to reduce the communication
complexity. An example could be Google’s GMail, where a user’s e-mail is
scanned, and textual ads are retrieved from Google’s database based on the text
of the e-mail. The e-mail text could be viewed by the database administrator,
or person with access to the data and transaction logs of the server, and when a
user pursues a resulting ad, the text of the e-mail could be inferred by someone
with access to the database or someone with access to the transaction logs of a
destination site linked by one of the chosen ads. This scenario could be mapped
to a potential PIR protocol. The e-mail text could be viewed as the private
query, and the textual ads retrieved from Google’s ad database could be the
privately retrieved result. This would also assume the added quality of Private
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Information Retrieval by Keyword [CGN]. This term is often confused with the
symmetric version.
Symmetric private information retrieval is the setting for the protocols de-
scribed in this thesis, at least in the semi-honest model with computationally
bounded client and server.
Definition 1.0.2 (Symmetric Private Information Retrieval [GYKM00])
A scheme with a protocol which satisfies the following properties
Inputs Client i∗ the desired index
Server x the private server-side database
Outputs Client xi∗ the entry in the server-side
database at the desired index
Server Nothing
Privacy Client Received entry unknown to the server
Server Client can only acquire the amount of information
allowed
The symmetric property of this scheme allows the database to be private, and
it allows for the restricting of the number of records a given client may re-
trieve. This is quite an enticing property for e-commerce scenarios. However,
ensuring the strict privacy required of a symmetric private information retrieval
protocol is potentially very costly both computationally and in the amount of
information communicated during the protocol. Several papers have attempted
to use symmetric private information retrieval in several e-commerce scenarios
[KBS02, BDF00, Bea97], but some have assumed that anonymous retrieval is
equivalent to private retrieval. Anonymity is not restricted, but simply hiding
the identity of the client does not ensure that the entry the client retrieved was
maintained as private [KBS02].
In [Rab81], Rabin introduced the cryptographic primitive [Kil88], Oblivious
Transfer (OT), which has also been presented by Yao as Oblivious Circuit Eval-
uation in [Yao90]. SPIR, by definition can be achieved by the use of Oblivious
Transfer.
Definition 1.0.3 (Oblivious Transfer) An oblivious transfer (OT) scheme
is a protocol in which the sending party sends a bit to the receiving party in a
way such that the receiving party receives the bit with probability of 12 without
the sending party knowing whether or not the receiving party received the correct
bit. This is equivalent to the sending party having two bits and the receiving
party will receive one of the bits without the sending party knowing which of the
two bits was received. This protocol is often denoted OT 21 , 1-out-of-2 oblivious
transfer.
There have been many flavors of OT protocols: hardware-based [Aso03],
private information retrieval by keyword [CGN], quantum PIR [KdW03], multi-
ple database PIR [CKGS98], PIR with preprocessing [BYT], random sequence
retrieval [NP99], etc.
3Most attempts have aimed at reducing the amount of communication, theo-
retically, but this thesis compares the computational expense of the algorithms
through experimentation to show that reduction of communication is less valu-
able in the effort of achieving a practical protocol than reducing the amount
of computation. Further, this thesis introduces new protocols to compete with
previous published protocols that derive security from additive homomorphic
probabilistic encryption schemes, and explores means to increase the length of
data handled by these protocols so that the media is more useful and the time
to complete the protocol is reasonable.
This thesis will explore the additive homomorphic probabilistic encryption
scheme based SPIR protocols with computationally bounded client and server.
Encryption schemes explored derive security from the following: quadratic
residues, prime residues, p-subgroups, and composite residues. These protocols
have evolved through variation and this thesis continues the evolutionary pro-
cess. Through experimental comparison of these variations, the proof of previous
theoretical comparisons will be justified or nullified, and the issue of whether
SPIR can be used for practical means will be addressed. As will be shown,
given the existing technology, these protocols are impractical, and where most
have considered the reduction of computation as a means to developing practi-
cal protocols, protocols which reduce computation rather than communication
will lead to a more practical solution.
The remainder of this chapter present the notations that will be used through
out this thesis. Chapter 2 will provide a brief overview of some secure compu-
tational models. Chapter 3 provides a survey of additive homomorphic proba-
bilistic encryption schemes emphasizing the evolution of such schemes. Chapter
4 provides a survey of published PIR protocols that are based on additive ho-
momorphic probabilistic encryption schemes. In Chapter 5 we present new
protocols based on the previously published protocols, and in Chapter 6 we
compare the protocols theoretically and then through experimentation we see
that previous assumptions of communication as the bottleneck of PIR protocols
are unjustified.
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1.1 Notations
Symbol Definition
|α| order
Pk public key
Sk secret (Private) key
D decryption function
E encryption function
m[i] a plaintext message
µ[i] a ciphertext message
ri randomly chosen integer
PT space containing all possible plaintexts
CT space containing all possible ciphertexts
N RSA composite, where N = pq and p and q are prime
c # of dimensions
s maximum exponent, used by length-flexible cryptosystem
t # of parts
ν modulus of ciphertext domain
K # of elements in the server-side private database
{xi}K−1i=0 linear server-side private database
xi database element at the ith index
i∗ index of element in private server-side database desired by the client
qi[j] i
th element of Q, an encrypted 0, 1-indicator, j
Q private query generated by client
Rs server-side result
Chapter 2
Models of Secure
Computation
When constructing secure multi-party communication protocols, it is helpful to
construct the protocol to be secure within a particular model of secure compu-
tation. Attempts can then be made to modify a protocol that is secure in one
model of secure computation to be secure in a model that allows for parties to
either perform more malicious actions before, during, or after the protocol or
to allow parties to have greater computational power. This suggests that there
are at least two different types of models of secure computation. The two mod-
els considered here are those models based on the honesty of the parties, and
those models based on the computational prowess of the parties. The protocols
explored in this thesis, however, are all secure within the semi-honest model
provided that the parties are computationally bounded.
2.1 Models Based on the Honesty of the Parties
This section discusses three models of secure computation that are based on
the honesty of the parties, but considering the scenario where only two parties
participate and that each party may be honest, semi-honest, or malicious, a
protocol could be constructed in which the client and server participate in the
protocol with different levels of honesty. The Ideal model is not dependent
on the honesty of either participating party because of a trusted third party.
The ideal model serves as a goal for all secure computations to meet for both
computational and communication complexities. If all participating parties are
honest, and all the parties trusted one another, then there is no need to construct
a protocol other than the trivial non-secure protocol. In the event that one out
of the two parties were honest, then the honest party could serve as the trusted
third party in the Ideal model. Thus, when constructing protocols to be secure
within a particular model of secure computation based on the honesty of the
parties, there really exist four possible models: both parties are semi-honest,
5
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both parties are malicious, the client is semi-honest and the server is malicious,
and the server is semi-honest while the client is malicious, where a semi-honest
party follows the protocol without deviation except for maintaining records of
the entire transaction for later cryptanalysis, and a malicious party may deviate
from the protocol at anytime.
2.1.1 Ideal
The ideal model in the two party scenario consists of the two parties that wish
to communicate and a trusted third party. A trusted third party is a party
apart from the two communicating parties that will leak no information to
any opposing communicating party concerning the party’s private input or the
party’s resulting output from the computation. The trusted third party is an
intermediary who can see the private inputs and outputs resulting from the
private computation, but the trusted third party will do nothing with the inputs
other than use them to perform the computation, and will do nothing with the
resulting outputs other than send the outputs to the appropriate communicating
party. Also note that the channels of communication are assumed to be secure.
The standard two-party ideal model protocol proceeds as follows [Gol]:
Sending Inputs to Trusted Third Party Each of the two communicating
parties sends his private input to the trusted third party as follows:
Honest First [Second] Party Sends input x [y].
Malicious [Second] Party Send input x′ ∈ {0, 1}|x| [y′ ∈ {0, 1}|y|].
Trusted Third Party Responds to First Communicating Party
Trusted third party answers the first communicating party from inputs
(x, y) as follows:
Assume Honest Responds with f1(x, y).
Assume Malicious Responds with ⊥.
Trusted Third Party Responds to Second Communicating Party
Trusted third party answers the second communicating party as follows:
Malicious First Party In the event the first communicating party is
not satisfied with the output and/or was malicious at input phase→
replies with ⊥ to second communicating party.
Otherwise Responds with f2(x, y).
Output Resulting output should be as follows:
Honest Party Message from trusted third party.
Malicious Party Arbitrary function of intial inputs and message from
trusted third party.
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It would be ideal to have an extraneous party which all communicating parties
can trust to maintain the privacy of each party’s inputs, perform the correct
computation, and send the appropriate output to each party. Provided that
the communication is performed over private channels, this model requires no
extra computations to hide the information. However, if two or more parties
cannot trust one another, how can the communicating parties trust a party
extraneous from the communicating group. It is indeed ideal, thus the name of
this model, to have a third party. Although the ideal model is near impossible
to achieve, the ideal model is not necessarily a model in which to construct new
secure multi-party protocols. Rather, this model serves as a metric for which
all protocols designed in the other two secure computation models based on the
honesty of each party will be compared.
2.1.2 Semi-Honest
The semi-honest model involves one or more semi-honest parties, and the re-
maining parties, if any, are honest. A semi-honest party is one who follows the
protocol properly with the exception that he keeps record of all intermediate
computations [Gol].
Almost all secure multi-party protocol constructions are designed initially
to meet the correctness and privacy requirements of the ideal model within the
semi-honest model, and for most of these constructions, the protocol does not
proceed to satisfying the requirements of the ideal model within the malicious
model, but the semi-honest model can satisfy some real world situations.
Most users may not have the knowledge base to deviate from the protocol.
Most user may not also have access to the same resources as a malicious party
might due to lack of user level priviliges. Transparency levels in the party’s
operating system may contribute to a lack of access to register and memory
contents. The party could be forced to use only the application provided by
the other party to participate in the protocol. Thus, given that parties are
restricted to behaving in a semi-honest manner due to the party’s inability to
act maliciously, a semi-honest protocol, which is much easier to construct and
implement than a corresponding protocol in the malicous model, will suffice in
most real world situations.
2.1.3 Malicious
The malicious model consists of one or more malicious parties which may at-
tempt to deviate from the protocol in any manner. A protocol constructed in
the malicious model must provide the same level of correctness and privacy as
the corresponding protocol in the ideal model. The malicious model protocol
should yield it impossible for a malicious party to deviate from the protocol save
for the following possibilities [Gol]:
• A party may refuse to participate in the protocol when the protocol is
first invoked.
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• A party may substitute his local input by entering the protocol with an
input other than the one provided to them.
• A party may abort prematurely.
Notice that the ideal model protocol accounts for the above three scenarios by
returning ⊥. If a party refuses to participate in the protocol, then the protocol
is not executed. If the party substitutes his local input, then he has chosen to
participate in the multi-party computation with a different input, and since the
other participating parties are not permitted to discover another party’s input,
it is even more unreasonable to know another party’s intended input, and a
machine obviously cannot determine a participating party’s intentions, thus the
substitution of a local input is permissible. Premature abortion is an allowable
deviation because it is improbable to prevent. A party’s system could fail, a
connection could go down, or a party could decide that he no longer wishes to
continue participation in the protocol. Since it is infeasible for any protocol to
prevent these three scenarios [Gol], these three scenarios need not be prevented.
2.2 Models Based on the Computing Power of
the Parties
Models concerning the computational power of the parties are also often consid-
ered for measuring the security of secure multi-party protocols. Since most cryp-
tographic operations are computationally expensive, the computational power
of the parties can be considered to simplify the scheme by increasing or decreas-
ing the amount of communication or by using weaker or stronger cryptographic
operations so long as the cryptographic operations are secure against adversaries
with a defined level of computational power.
2.2.1 Information Theoretically Secure
If a party is computationally unbounded, then if given enough information,
no matter how strongly encrypted, unless something unconditionally secure is
used, the party will be able to derive the answer. A protocol is information
theoretically secure if it can maintain the specified privacy of all the parties
when one or more parties is computationally unbounded. Thus the protocol
cannot allow a computationally unbounded party to receive more information,
whether encrypted or not, than is allowed by the specified privacy.
2.2.2 Computationally Secure
If a party is computationally bounded, then the party can only view information
that is received in plaintext, information which the party can decrypt because
the party possesses the keys to decrypt the information or the information that
is encrypted with a weak encryption scheme. A weak encryption scheme in this
case is when the plaintext form of the information encrypted by this encryption
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scheme can be extracted by the party without the keys to decrypt the infor-
mation because the computational power of the party is great enough. Thus a
protocol is computationally secure if the information that is not to be received
by a party, according to the specified privacy policy, is encrypted with a scheme
that the party cannot break with its bounded computational power.
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Chapter 3
A Branch of Probabilistic
Encryption
Probabilistic encryption was introduced by Goldwasser and Micali in [GM84],
and has since split into multiple branches. The most popular branch, con-
sisting of public-key encryption schemes such as ElGamal and Elliptic Curves,
derives security from the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption, but Diffie-
Hellman based schemes allow only for plaintext in multiplicative groups. An-
other branch, gaining popularity in academic research, derives security from
Residue Class Problems. This branch allows for plaintext in additive groups.
Additive groups are desirable domains for plaintext over multiplicative groups
due to the presence of 0 as a possible plaintext. With bit-by-bit encryption
of {0, 1}∗, one can send encrypted indicators of desirable indices to accomplish
oblivious transfer, or could tally the number of yes votes to determine the ma-
jority vote. This branch of probabilistic encryption, the branch of encryption
schemes acting on plaintexts in additive groups that derive security from the in-
tractibility of particular residue class problems, has been used in many research
papers. The following chapter is one of few, if any, outlining the evolution of
this branch.
3.1 Background and Definitions
Around 1976, Martin Hellman, Ralph Merkle, Whitfield Diffie, and potentially
others, developed the notion of public-key encryption [MVO96].
Definition 3.1.1 (Public-Key Encryption) A cryptosystem which uses two
keys, a public key and a private key. The public key and the algorithm for en-
cryption and decryption, may be published so that others may send encrypted
messages. The private key is kept secret by the receiver for decryption of mes-
sages encrypted by the corresponding public key. The private key cannot be
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easily discovered from knowledge of the public key or encryption and decryption
algorithms. Also known as Asymmetric Encryption.
The development of public-key cryptography alleviated the key distribution
issues inherent with private-key cryptosystems. Private-key cryptosystems rely
on maintaining the privacy of a single private key which is used for both encryp-
tion and decryption. Thus, to receive an encrypted message from a sender, the
private-key must be shared with that sender by non-public means. But how can
the key be shared and not revealed to undesirable senders? Public-key absolves
this issue by allowing for the encryption key to be made public without com-
promising security. The security of most public-key cryptosystems is dependent
upon at least one computational assumption.
In 1977, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman developed the RSA Cryptosystem,
see [Sti02]. The public key can be defined as (a,N) and the private key can be
defined as (b, p, q) where N = pq and ab ≡ 1 mod φ(N) for primes p and q.
φ(·) is the Euler-φ function where φ(N) = (p−1)(q−1). Without knowledge of
p and q, it is impractical to determine φ(N), and thus it is difficult to determine
b from knowledge of just a and N . It can be easily seen that the security of the
RSA cryptosystem is dependent upon the difficulty of factoring large numbers.
RSA is one example of a deterministic cryptosystem.
Definition 3.1.2 (Deterministic Encryption) Given security parameter n,
let PT n denote the finite domain consisting of all possible plaintexts, and CT n
denote the finite domain consisting of all possible ciphertexts. A deterministic
encryption scheme consists of a one-to-one function E : PT n 7→ CT n.
Consider E to be the encryption algorithm and D to be the decryption al-
gorithm. Using the keys described above, a plaintext m can be encrypted with
E(m) = mb mod n. Thus, RSA is a deterministic encryption scheme. Deter-
ministic encryption schemes lack semantic security.
Definition 3.1.3 (Semantic Security) Given two messages, m0 and m1, of
equal-size, generated by a computationally-bounded adversary. If the adversary
sends these two messages to an encryption oracle which chooses one of these two
messages at random to encrypt and return the generated ciphertext to the ad-
versary and the adversary cannot distinguish which of the original messages the
returned ciphertext relates to with probability greater than 12 , then the encryption
algorithm used by the encryption oracle is said to be semantically secure.
However, probabilistic encryption schemes do not lack semantic security.
Introduced in [GM84] by Goldwasser and Micali, probabilistic encryption intro-
duces randomness during the encryption algorithm, so that various ciphertexts
can be generated from one plaintext. A string of bits can be sent encrypted bit-
by-bit via a deterministic encryption scheme, but an eavesdropper could look
at the string of encrypted values and have a 12 chance of guessing the entire
string, but the same string encrypted with a probabilistic encryption scheme
can be intercepted by an eavesdropper, and the eavesdropper would only have a
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1
2 chance of guessing a single bit right, so given a bit string of length k encrypted
with a probabilistic encryption scheme, an eavesdropper would now only have a(
1
2
)k chance of guessing the entire string. Thus, the introduction of randomness
in an encryption scheme ensures semantic security since knowledge of one bit
does not imply knowledge of any other bit encrypted by the same encryption
scheme.
Definition 3.1.4 (Probabilistic Encryption) Given security parameter n,
let PT n denote the finite domain consisting of all possible plaintexts, RT n de-
note the finite domain consisting of all possible randomness, and CT n denote the
finite domain consisting of all possible ciphertexts. A probabilistic encryption
scheme consists of a function E : PT n ×RT n 7→ CT n such that ∃µ1, µ2 ∈ CT n
where µ1 6= µ2 but D(µ1) = D(µ2) is possible.
When Goldwasser and Micali introduced probabilistic encryption in [GM84],
the encryption scheme presented was based on the difficulty of computing residue
classes, quadratic residues in particular, and led to the development of many
other probabilistic encryption schemes based on the difficulty of computing
residue classes of other functions within a group.
Definition 3.1.5 (Residue Class) The residue classes of a function
f(x) mod n are all possible values of the residue, or congruence, f(x) mod n.
Example 3.1.1 The residue classes of x2 mod 6 are {0, 1, 3, 4}.
A year later, [Gam85] introduced the ElGamal encryption scheme. The
security of the ElGamal encryption scheme relies upon the Computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption, or difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
Assumption 3.1.1 (Diffie-Hellman Assumption [Sti02]) Given a multi-
plicative cyclic group (G, ·), an element α ∈ G having order n, and two elements
β, γ ∈ 〈α〉. There is no known polynomial time algorithm to compute δ ∈ 〈α〉
such that logαδ ≡ logα β × logα γ mod N .
ElGamal is defined as follows where p is a prime such that it is infeasible to
solve a discrete logarithm in Z∗p.
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Encryption Scheme 3.1.1 (ElGamal [Sti02])
Plaintext Space: Z∗p
Random Space: Z∗p
Ciphertext Space: Z∗p × Z∗p
Public Key: p
α ∈ Z∗p where |α| = p− 1
β = αa mod p
Private Key: a
Encryption: E(m, r) = (µ1, µ2)
µ1 = αr mod p
µ2 = xβr mod p
Decryption: D(µ1, µ2) = m2(m1a)−1 mod p
The Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme and the El Gamal encryption
scheme pioneered the two major branches of probabilistic encryption. Attempts
were made using error correcting codes [McE78], lattice problems [NS98b], ad-
ditive and multiplicative knapsack-type systems [MH88, Vau98, NS97] and mul-
tivariate polynomials [MI88, Pat97] to create further types of probabilistic en-
cryption schemes, but these schemes were cryptanalyzed and found to suffer
inefficiencies, security weakness, or lack of public scrutiny.
Basing the security of an encryption scheme on assumptions such as the
difficulty of computing particular residue classes for certain functions and the
difficulty of computing discrete logarithms leads towards the development of
encryption schemes that are not just easily adapted to probabilistic encryp-
tion schemes, but also leads to encryption schemes that have a homomorphic
property.
Definition 3.1.6 (Group Homomorphism) A group homomorphism is a
mapping φ : G 7→ H between two groups such that
• f(g1g2) = f(g1)f(g2) and
• f(eG) = eH
When discussing a probabilistic encryption scheme as being homomorphic,
the first property can be stated more loosely as
E(m1 ⊕m2, r3) = E(m1, r1)⊗ E(m2, r2)
where ⊕ and ⊗ can be any valid operations.
Example 3.1.2 The ElGamal encryption scheme, is multiplicatively homomor-
phic in that E(m1 ·m2, r1+ r2) = E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2). Since, using component-
wise multiplication
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E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = (αr1 ,m1βr1) · (αr2 ,m2βr2)
= (αr1αr2 ,m1βr1m2βr2)
= (αr1αr2 ,m1m2βr1βr2)
= (αr1+r2 ,m1m2βr1+r2)
= E(m1 ·m2, r1 + r2)
Refer to [Sti02] for the details of the El Gamal encryption scheme.
3.2 Encryption Schemes
The following sections will continue with the branch of probabilistic encryption
schemes which derive security from the difficulty of computing residue classes of
particular functions in a fashion that highlights each schemes semantic security
and additive homomorphic property.
3.2.1 Goldwasser-Micali Encryption Scheme
The Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme was developed in [GM84], and is
regarded as the first probabilistic encryption scheme. The scheme encrypts a
single bit and takes a random element of the group Z∗N to produce a ciphertext
within the group Z∗Nwhere N = pq is an RSA composite, such that p and q are
prime. The encryption function requires a fixed element y which is a quadratic
nonresidue of Z∗N .
Definition 3.2.1 (Quadratic Residue) Let p be an odd prime and gcd(a, p) =
1. If x2 ≡ a mod p has a solution, then a is a quadratic residue. Otherwise, a
is called a quadratic nonresidue modulo p.
It is easy to see that the product of two quadratic residues is a quadratic
residue and that the product of a quadratic residue and a quadratic nonresidue
is a quadratic nonresidue. Also, for all numbers r ∈ Z∗N , r2 is a quadratic
residue of Z∗N . Since we chose a fixed element g ∈ Z∗N that is a quadratic
nonresidue, raise g to a power equal to the plaintext x, then if m = 0, g0 = 1
which is clearly a quadratic residue, and if m = 1 , g1 = g which is clearly a
quadratic nonresidue. Since r2 is a quadratic residue, the product r2 · gm is a
quadratic residue if m = 0, and is a quadratic nonresidue if m = 1. Thus, a
logical encryption function would be E(m, r) = r2gm mod N .
Decryption of the ciphertext is simply a matter of determining whether or
not the ciphertext is a quadratic residue or quadratic nonresidue in Z∗N . If the
factorization of N is known, then Legendre’s symbol can be used to determine
whether the ciphertext µ is a quadratic residue or a quadratic nonresidue.
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Definition 3.2.2 (Legendre’s Symbol) For prime p
(
a
p
)
=

1 if a is a quadratic residue
0 if a|p
-1 if a is a quadratic nonresidue
Properties
1. If a ≡ b mod p, then
(
a
p
)
=
(
b
p
)
.
2.
(
a2
p
)
= 1
3.
(
a
p
)
≡ a p−12 mod p
4.
(
ab
p
)
=
(
a
p
)(
b
p
)
5.
(
1
p
)
= 1 and
(
−1
p
)
= (−1) p−12
6.
(
ab2
p
)
=
(
a
p
)(
b2
p
)
=
(
a
p
)
Example 3.2.1 [Bur02] Is −46 a quadratic residue mod 17?(−46
17
)
=
(−1
17
)(
46
17
)
by property 4
=
(
46
17
)
=
(
12
17
)
by property 5
=
(
3 · 22
17
)
=
(
3
17
)
by property 6
≡ 3 17−12 ≡ 38 ≡ 812 ≡ (−4)2 ≡ −1 mod 17
Thus −46 is a quadratic nonresidue mod 17.
To encrypt a plaintext m, g and N must be public. The random number
r ∈ Z∗N is unnecessary for decryption and will be generated for each encryption.
For decryption, there must be knowledge of N ’s prime factors, p and q. Thus,
p and q must be the private keys in the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme.
Without the prime factors of N , it is difficult to determine whether or not the
ciphertext µ is a quadratic residue or a quadratic nonresidue in Z∗N . Thus,
the security of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem rests upon the Quadratic
Residuosity Assumption.
Assumption 3.2.1 (Quadratic Residuosity) Any polynomial-time
algorithm, or polynomial-sized circuit, can only accurately determine whether a
negligible fraction of values are quadratic residues modulo N . Where N = pq, a
RSA composite.
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In summary, the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem is as follows.
Encryption Scheme 3.2.1 (Goldwasser-Micali)
Plaintext Space: {0, 1}
Random Space: Z∗N
Ciphertext Space: Z∗N
Public Key: g, N
Private Key: p, q
Encryption: µ = r2gm mod N
Decryption:
(
µ
p
)
Note:
N = pq where p, q are k-bit primes
g 6≡ m2 mod N(
µ
p
)
=
{
1, m = 0
-1, m = 1
3.2.2 Benaloh Encryption Scheme
In [Ben87], the Benaloh encryption scheme was introduced. The construction
of the Benaloh encryption scheme is buried in Benaloh’s doctoral thesis which
concerns electronic voting. Thus it may be simpler to read this section after
Section 3.2.3, which discusses the descendant encryption scheme, Naccache-
Stern. The Benaloh encryption scheme performs computation in prime residue
groups.
Definition 3.2.3 (Prime Residue Group) A multiplicative subgroup G of
the group ZN , where pi ∈ G if gcd(pi, N) = 1.
Some Properties
• |G| = φ(N)
• G is cyclic if and only if N = 2, 4, pe, or 2pe
The basis of security in the Benaloh encryption scheme is the prime residuosity
assumption.
Assumption 3.2.2 (Prime Residuosity) For all p where p is relatively prime
to N , there does not exist a probabilistic or deterministic algorithm which de-
cides pth residues in polynomial time.
Let public key tuple be (g, k,N) where g 6= wk mod N when k is a prime
divisor of φ(N), but k2 is not a prime divisor of φ(N), w ∈ Z∗N , and N = p · q is
an RSA composite. Let the private key tuple consist solely of φ(N). Consider y
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to be a wisely chosen constant analogous to g in the Naccahe-Stern encryption
scheme and k analogous to σ. The encryption function follows the common
form of all encryption schemes discussed in this chapter.
E(m) = rkgm mod N
To recover m, the following decryption function D(µ) can be applied
D(µ) =
(
logg µ
φ(N)
k
)
· k
φ(N)
since
µ
φ(N)
k = rφ(N) · gm·φ(N)k
Key generation can mimic the key generation presented as an example in
[NS98a]. Select ` randomly chosen distinct primes such that when {p}` are
partitioned into two sets of equal length, which will be referred to as {p1} `
2
and
{p2} `
2
. Now set
N =
 `2∏
i=1
p1i
+ 1
 ·
 `2∏
i=1
p2i
+ 1

so that N is essentially the product of two distinct primes. Thus
φ(N) =
 `2∏
i=1
p1i
 ·
 `2∏
i=1
p2i

Finally, let k = pij where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ `2 and i and j are chosen at
random. It is easily seen that k | φ(N) and k2 - φ(N). However, N can be often
factored with the Pollard-Rho algorithm, see Stinson [Sti02] for description.
In summary, the Benaloh cryptosystem is as follows.
Encryption Scheme 3.2.2 (Benaloh[Ben87])
Plaintext Space: m < k
Random Space: Z∗N
Ciphertext Space: Z∗N
Public Key: g, k, N
Private Key: φ(N)
Encryption: µ = rkgm mod N
Decryption: m = (logg µ
φ(N)
k ) · kφ(N)
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3.2.3 Naccache-Stern Encryption Scheme
The Naccache-Stern encryption scheme was introduced in [NS98a]. The security
of the Naccache-Stern encryption system rests upon the Higher Residuosity
Assumption.
Assumption 3.2.3 (Higher Residuosity) It is difficult to distinguish inte-
gers of the form xp mod N when p is a prime divisor of φ(N).
The Naccache-Stern encryption scheme can be viewed as multiplicative ver-
sion of the basic (additive) knapsack problem. The transformation of the basic
knapsack problem to a multiplicative one is made possible by combining tech-
niques from the multiplicative Merkle-Hellmen Knapsack and Pohlig-Hellman’s
secret-key cryptosystem. That is, the notion of super increasing sets and de-
termining discrete logarithms via the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm supplement the
inner workings of the Naccache-Stern encryption scheme.
Let the public key be represented by the tuple (g, σ,N) and the private key
be represented by the tuple (φ(N), {p}i, {q}i). Choose a k so that N = pq,
where p =
(∏k
i=0 pi
)
+ 1 and q =
(∏k
i=0 qi
)
+ 1 are distinct primes, such
that the sets pk and qk contain distinct primes and the intersection of both
sets is empty. Set σ =
Qk
i=0 piqi
pm·qn . Let φ (·) denote the Euler-φ function, so that
φ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1) =∏ki=0 piqi. Now choose a g such that the multiplicative
order modulo pq+1 of g is a multiple of σ. This, however, could make Naccache-
Stern breakable by p− 1 factoring.
Considering the computational assumption concerning higher residuosity,
since it is difficult to distinguish integers of the form xp mod N when p is
a prime divisor of φ(N) and the prime factorization of σ consists of all but
two prime divisors of φ(N), σ is roughly analogous to 2 in the Goldwasser-
Micali encryption scheme. Also, g was chosen wisely in the Goldwasser-Micali
encryption scheme to be a quadratic non-residue of N , but here it is more fitting
for g to be chosen wisely as having a multiplicative order modulo pq + 1 which
is a multiple of σ. Without loss of generality, we can maintain the form of the
encryption function from the previously discussed encryption schemes by letting
E(m) = rσgm mod N .
Pohlig-Hellman’s algorithm for computing discrete logs, helps to compute
the discrete logarithm modulus N where N is a family of distinct primes as
follows.
Algorithm 3.2.1 (Pohlig-Hellman) [Sti02] Consider
N =
k∏
i=1
(pi)ci
where the pi’s are distinct primes. The value of a = logαβ can be uniquely
determined mod N by observing that we can compute a mod pcii for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and then compute a mod N by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
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Since σ was chosen as a family of distinct primes, the set of distinct primes
remains private, and we wish to have an encryption scheme with security depen-
dent upon the Higher Residuosity Assumption, the decryption algorithm will
be quite similar to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for discrete logarithms.
NSDecrypt1({µi}, {pi}, g,N)
1 for i← 1 to k
2 do µi ← µ
φ(N)
pi mod N
3 for j ← 0 to pi − 1
4 do if µi = g
jφ(N)
pi mod N
5 then m′i ← j
6 m← ChineseRemainder{m′i}, {pi}
7 return m
Since
µi = µ
φ(N)
pi
= g
mφ(n)
pi
= g
(m′i+µipi)φ(N)
pi
= gm
′
iφ(N)pig
µiφ(N)
= g
m′iφ(N)
pi mod N
By determining the discrete logarithm of ci modulus N and multiplying by
pi
φ(N) , we can set mi to the resulting value. Then by use of the Chinese Re-
mainder Theorem we can compute the original message m from m′i mod pi for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. It can easily be seen that the decryption algorithm is a special
case of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for discrete logarithms. The algorithm
above is from [NS98a]. To solve intermediate discrete logarithms, the above
algorithm uses a naive algorithm for computing discrete logarithms. If the con-
ditions allowed to supplement this portion with Shank’s algorithm[Sti02], we
would proceed as follows.
NSDecrypt2({µi}, {pi}, g,N)
1 for i← 1 to k
2 do µi ← µ
φ(N)
pi mod N
3 m′i ← Shanks(N, g, µi) · piφ(N)
4 m← ChineseRemainder{m′i}, {pi}
5 return m
This algorithm might also allow for the Pollard-Rho algorithm[Sti02] for
discrete logarithms, by replacing the call to Shank’s with a call to Pollard Rho.
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In summary, the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem is as follows.
Encryption Scheme 3.2.3 (Naccache-Stern[NS98a])
Plaintext Space: m < σ
Random Space: r < N
Ciphertext Space: ZN
Public Key: g, N
Private Key: p, q
Encryption: µ = rσgm mod N
Decryption: NSDecrypt({µi}, {pi}, g, N)
3.2.4 Okamoto-Uchiyama Encrytpion Scheme
The Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme was introduced in [OU98]. It per-
forms computations in p-subgroups.
Definition 3.2.4 (p-Group) Let p be a prime number. G is a p-group when
G = {x : |x| = pk}. Equivalently, the number of elements in G is a power of p.
Theorem 3.2.1 (p-Subgroup) Every finite group has subgroups which are p-
groups.
Let the public key tuple be (g, h,N). The Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption
scheme uses a slightly different composite N compared to the previously dis-
cussed encryption schemes. Here p and q will be chosen such that dlog2 pe =
dlog2 qe = d log2N3 e, so that N = p2 · q. Choose a random g < N , such that
gp = gp−1 mod p2
where gp has order p in Z∗p2 . Similarly, choose g
′ < N , such that
h = g′N mod N
The private key tuple is thus (p, q, gp).
In the other encryption schemes presented in this chapter, there has been
a y or g chosen wisely for easy computation of a discrete logarithm with base
y or g, this is also true of the Okamoto-Uchiyama; however, there was also a
wisely chosen exponent to be applied to the randomness r introduced in the
encryption function E . That is not quite the case in the Okamoto-Uchiyama
encryption scheme. The public key value h is used as a base and r is used as
the exponent. Since h = g′N mod N , hr = g′Nr mod N , which is essentially
a random number to the N th times r power. The resulting encryption function
is as follows
E(m) = gmhr mod N
The decryption algorithm D can be completed in two steps
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1. µ′ = µp−1 mod p2
2. m = log(µ′) log(gp)−1 mod p
Notice that
µ′ = µp−1 mod p2 = gpm(p−1)g′
nr(p−1) = gmp mod p
2
so it can be seen that
log(µ′) = m · (p− 1)
log(gp) = (p− 1)
Thus log(µ′) log(gp)−1 mod p = m.
In summary, the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is as follows.
Encryption Scheme 3.2.4 (Okamoto-Uchiyama[OU98])
Plaintext Space: Zq
Random Space: Z∗p2
Ciphertext Space: Z∗N
Public Key: N , g, h
Private Key: p, q
Encryption: µ = hrgm mod N
Decryption: m = logp(µ′) logg(gp)−1 mod p
3.2.5 Paillier Encryption Scheme
The most used Residuosity Class Problem based probabilistic encryption scheme
in academic research was introduced by Pascal Paillier in [Pai99]. His encryption
scheme is based on the Composite Residuosity Class Problem. A composite
residue, or N th residue, is as follows
Definition 3.2.5 (Composite Residue) (N th residue) A number z is said
to be an N th residue modulo N2 if there exists a number y ∈ Z∗N2 such that
z ≡ yN mod N2. The set of N th residues is a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗N2of
order φ(N).
Considering that the encryption scheme relies upon computation of compos-
ite residues, encryption can be treated similar to that of the previously men-
tioned encryption schemes. For now, consider the Goldwasser-Micali encryption
scheme. Since the Goldwasser-Micali scheme relied upon recognizing quadratic
residues, the randomness was squared, and since the Pascal encryption scheme
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relies upon composite residues, the randomness should be raised to the N th
power. For all of the previous encryption schemes, the residue classes were
computed modulo N , but composite residue classes are computed modulo N2.
Thus the encryption function will change as follows
E(m) = rNgm mod N2
To be consistent with previously mentioned encryption schemes, g must
be chosen such that the discrete logarithm base g modulo N can be easily
computed. Consider the N th roots of unity for Z∗N2 .
Definition 3.2.6 (N th Roots of Unity of Z∗N2) (1+N)
x = 1+xN mod N2
The discrete logarithm of some value base (1+N) modulo N2 is 1+ xN , so
log(1+N) µ mod N
2−1
N = m where µ = (1 +N)
m. Thus it would be advantageous
to choose a g ∈ Z∗N such that g = (1 + N)jx mod N2. By choosing g in this
manner, the encryption function E is now a one-one correspondence.
Consider that if the plaintext m ∈ ZN , and the randomness r ∈ Z∗N , then
E : ZN × Z∗N 7→ Z∗N2 . Since |ZN | = N and |Z∗N | = φ(N), then since |Z∗N2 | =
N · φ(N) it is easily seen that E is an onto function. Thus, it must be shown
that E is one-to-one due to the choice of g.
Before it can be shown that E is a one-one correspondence, the private key
must be explained. The private key can be simply represented as the tuple
(p, q) where N = p · q, but for decryption, which will be explained later, let λ =
lcm(p−1, q−1). Now for verification that E is indeed a one-one correspondence,
consider
is gm1r1N ≡ gm2r2N mod N2?
Where m1,m2 ∈ ZN and r1, r2 ∈ Z∗N .
⇒ gm1−m2 r2
r1
N ≡ 1 mod N2
⇒ |g| | λ(m2 = m1)
⇒ N | λ(m2 −m1)
⇒ gcd(λ,N) = 1
⇒ m2 −m1 | N
⇒ m2 −m1 ≡ 0 mod N
⇒ r2
r1
= 1 uniquely
⇒ m1 = m2 and µ1 = µ2
⇒ E(m, r) is a one-one correspondence.
While the encryption function E does not necessarily have to be a onto, it does
have to be one-to-one so that the function is invertible. Thus it is possible to
decrypt.
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The decryption function D is as follows
D(µ) = L(µ
λ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N
where
L(u) =
u− 1
N
for u ∈ Z∗N2 and
λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
is chosen such that the decryption algorithm can remove the randomness intro-
duced during encryption. For RSA N we can assume λ = (p−1)(q−1)2 . Notice
µλ = (1 +N)mλrNλ
= (1 +N)mλ
= (1 +N)mλ
= 1 +mλN mod N2
and thus
L(µλ mod N2) = mλ
and since
L(gλ (mod N)2) = L(1 + λN) = λ
it can easily be seen that D(E(m, r)) = m.
With knowledge of p and q, a λ could be chosen such that the randomness
introduced in encryption was removed and the choice of g allowed for quick
computation of discrete logarithms. Thus, the security of Paillier’s encryption
scheme relies on the Composite Residuosity Assumption.
Assumption 3.2.4 (Composite Residuosity Assumption) There does not
exist a polynomial time distinquisher for N th residues modulo N2.
In summary, the Paillier cryptosystem is as follows.
Encryption Scheme 3.2.5 (Paillier[Pai99])
Plaintext Space: ZN
Random Space: Z∗N
Ciphertext Space: Z∗N2
Public Key: g, N
Private Key: p, q
Encryption: µ = gmrN mod N2
Decryption: m = L(µ
λ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N
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For the remainder of this thesis, the case where g = N + 1 will be the only
case considered, since this case is much simpler to handle, but gives the same
security.
3.2.6 Damg˚ard-Jurik Encryption Scheme
Damg˚ard and Jurik extended Paillier’s encryption scheme in [DJ03]. Notice that
(1 +N)x mod N2 = 1 + xN mod N2. This is due to the binomial expansion
(1 +N)x = 1 +
(
x
1
)
N +
(
x
2
)
N2 + · · ·+
(
x
x
)
Nx
Damg˚ard and Jurik, in [DJ03], consider modulus Ns+1, rather than N2. Thus
(1 +N)x mod Ns+1 = (1 +
(
x
1
)
N +
(
x
2
)
N2 + · · ·+
(
x
s
)
Ns) mod Ns+1
To find the discrete logarithm base (1+N) of a number a with modulus Ns,
the following algorithm can be applied
DiscreteLog(a,N, s)
1 i← 0
2 for j ← 1 to s
3 do t1 ← L(a mod N j+1)
4 t2 ← i
5 for k ← 2 to j
6 do i← i− 1
7 t2 ← t2 · i mod N j
8 t1 ← t1 − t2·Nk−1k! mod N j
9 i← t1
10 return i
Essentially the public key will be the same tuple as in Paillier (g,N), but
since s can vary, the resulting public key tuple will be (g,N, s) where s > 1.
Since it is easy to find the discrete log base (1+N), g = (1+N)jx mod N2 as
in Paillier’s encryption scheme, and thus the case where s = 1, the encryption
schemes are essentially the same. To account for the expansion exponent s
E(m) = gmrNs mod Ns+1
The decryption D is similar to Paillier’s decryption function as well. Let
d ≡ 0 mod λ where λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) as before. It is easy to compute m
from µjd. Let g = (1 +N) which implies j = 1, then
µd = ((1 +N)mrN
s
)d
= (1 +N)md mod N
s
(gmrN
s
)d mod λ
= (1 +N)m mod Ns+1
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Note: g = (1 +N) = (1 +N)jµ mod Ns+1
In summary, the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem is as follows.
Encryption Scheme 3.2.6 (Damg˚ard-Jurik[DJ03])
Plaintext Space: ZNs
Random Space: Z∗N
Ciphertext Space: Z∗Ns+1
Public Key: g, N , s
Private Key: p, q
Encryption: µ = gmrN
s
mod Ns+1
Decryption: compute m mod Ns from µd
Chapter 4
Previous PIR Protocols
The protocols covered in this chapter make use of the additive homomorphic
probabilistic encryption schemes discussed in Chapter 3. The additive property
of the encryption scheme chosen for the protocol allows the client to encrypt 0, 1
indicators. Multiplicative encryption schemes, like ElGamal, do not allow for
encryption of 0s. The probabilistic property of the chosen encryption scheme
provides semantic security of the encrypted 0, 1 indicators. Without semantic
security the server would now have a 12 chance of guessing which of the encrypted
values were the encryption of 0 and which were the encryption of 1, but since, as
will be shown in this chapter, there will be a known number of 0s and 1s and the
number of 0s will never be the same as the number of 1s, without the semantic
security provided by a probabilisitc encryption scheme, the server will know
which of the encrypted values are 0 and which are 1 with absolute certainty.
With the semantic security provided by the chosen encryption scheme, the server
will have 1
2K
chance of guessing which index the server-side private database the
set of 0, 1 indicators is referring to. The homomorphic property of the chosen
encryption scheme, D(E(m0) · E(m1) = m0 + m1 where m0,m1 ∈ PT and E
and D are respectively the encryption and decryption functions of the chosen
encryption scheme, as shown in this chapter, will allow for the encrypted 0, 1
indicators to filter the entries in the database to an encryption of the desired
index which can be sent back to the user as a server-side response Rs, that the
client will be capable of extracting the result from with knowledge of its private
key Sk.
4.1 Generic Protocol
The following protocols were presented as one-round protocols secure in the
semi-honest model. Since the client chooses the public key, private key pair
(Pk, Sk) secure under a probabilistic additive homomorphic cryptosystem, as
presented in Chapter 3, when the client and server both follow the protocol
from start to finish, upon completion of the protocol, the user will have a valid
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Client Server
Input: i∗ Input: {xi}K−1i=0 , c, s
1. Acquire Server
Parameters
Request
Database Size
# of Dimensions1
Dimension Length1
Data Size
# of Splits2
Maximum Exponent3 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→req Send
Database Size
# of Dimensions1
Dimension Length1
Data Size
# of Splits2←−−−−−−−−−
K, c, d c√Ke, Maximum Exponent3
dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e, t, s
2. Generate Query
(Pk,Sk), Q −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Q,N
3. Process Query
Against Database←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Rs fN : Q× {xi}K−1i=0 → Rs
4. Extract Result
fN
−1 : Rs → Rc
Output: Rc = xi∗ Output: NULL
1If the protocol references {xi}K−1i=0 as {xi0,i1,...,ic−1}∀i0,i1,ic−1∈Z` , i = d c
√
Ke
2If the protocol requires intermediate results to be split
3If the protocol uses the length-flexible cryptosystem
Figure 4.1: Generic Protocol
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output, xi∗ the element residing at the desired index i∗ of the server’s private
linear database, and the server will be guaranteed that the client received only
one item from the private linear database and no information about any other
entry in the database. The server will also not be able to determine which entry
of the private linear database that the client retrieved, unless the server can
decrypt the query sent by the client. The client also will not be able to discover
any other entries in the database since the well-formed query will return a result
that can only be decrypted to one plaintext message, the entry residing at index
i∗ in the server’s private linear database. As can be seen later from the structure
of the client-side queries, if the client chooses multiple indices, the client will not
receive multiple entries, but at best the sum of those entries at those indices.
These protocols were initially presented as one-round protocols, but these
protocols assume that the client and server have already agreed upon some pub-
lic parameters. Assuming that the server and the client are not well acquainted,
the client will have to request the public parameters from the server, and the
server should return the appropriate parameters. Appropriate parameters al-
low for the client to produce a query that will properly retrieve any desired
index i∗ from the server’s private linear database. If the query is not properly
structured for the server’s database, then the client will not have access to all
of the entries in the database in the event that the server informs the client of
a smaller database size. The client may retrieve the wrong index if the server
provides the wrong number of dimensions. The client may retrieve garbage if
the server informs the client that the number of bytes in an entry is smaller than
the actual maximum number of bytes in any entry. The number of parts, in the
protocols that split intermediate results, however, can be easily inferred from
the server-side result Rs, if all other parameters were conveyed correctly, but
the maximum exponent s must be agreed upon when using the length-flexible
cryptosystem presented by Damg˚ard-Jurik in [DJ03], or the error result will be
the same as when the data size was incorrectly conveyed.
Expanding these protocols to two-rounds, with the requesting and retrieving
of parameters as round one, the protocols flow as described in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Stern Protocol
The first protocol to use additive homomorphic probabilistic encryption schemes
as part of a Private Information Retrieval protocol was the Stern protocol
[Ste98]. The Stern protcol is the simplest protocol presented, as it references
the server-side private linear database as an array, that is using a single index,
which in later protcols is not the case. Understanding of the Stern protocol is
necessary as it is the foundation of later protocols.
4.2.1 Encrypting 0’s and 1’s
The probabilistic property of the encryption schemes mentioned in Chapter 3
provides semantic security. Thus, if a user encrypted {0, 1}∗ there would be a
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1
2 chance of guess whether a single element in the string was a 0 or a 1 from
the ciphertext result of encrypting the string bit-by-bit, and there would be
a 1
2K
chance of guessing the entire string of length K correctly, as opposed
to a 12 chance of guessing all of a {0, 1}∗, if the ciphertext was a result of a
non-semantically secure cryptosystem.
The cryptosystems also fulfilled the following property ∀x ∈ PT
D(E (0)x) = 0
D(E (1)x) = x
which when the {0, 1}K = 0v10w where v +w = K − 1 and i∗ = v the index of
the character 1, the client’s desired index, this property can be combined with
the homomorphic property of the mentioned cryptosystems
D (E (m0) · E (m1)) = m0 +m1 mod ν
where the domain of the ciphertext, CT = Zν , to single out one element in a
collection {xi}K−1i=0 , where xi ∈ PT ∀i, as follows
D
(
K−1∏
i=0
E (mi, ri)xi mod ν
)
= xi∗
Thus, if the collection {xi}K−1i=0 is the server-side private database, then the
client could generate a query that is a collection {qi}K−1i=0 that is the resulting
bit-by-bit encryption of 0v10w such that
qi =
{
E (1) i = i ∗ (= v)
E (0) otherwise
and privately retrieve the element xi∗ by computing
Rs =
K−1∏
i=0
qi
xi mod ν.
4.2.2 Implementing
See Appendix A.1 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
GetDatabaseSize()
Description Retrieves the number of elements in the database, so
that the client can generate a query that corresponds to the length
of the database.
Returns the number of elements in the database. K
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GetDataSize()
Description Retrieves the bit-length of the element with the great-
est value in the database.
Returns the suggested minimum bit-length of the client-side public-
key parameter N , disregarding the minimum supposed to be secure
for RSA. dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e
2. Generate Query
Stern-Query(i∗)
Description Generates a query with one element per each element
in the database. Where each element is the encryption of the plain-
text 0, unless the element is at index i∗. The element at index i∗ is
the encryption of the plaintext 1.
Parameters
i∗ The index the client wishes to privately retrieve from the server.
Returns the private query to be sent to the server for retrieving
index i∗. Q = {qi}K−1i=0 where qi = E(0) for i 6= i∗ and qi = E(1) for
i = i∗
3. Process Query Against Database
Stern-Perform-Retrieval(Q, ν)
Description Takes the client’s private query and processes the
query against the database.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
4. Extract Result
Stern-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
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Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
4.3 Chang Protocol
The Chang protcol was introduced in [Cha04]. The Chang protocol builds
upon the Stern protocol by reducing the client to server communication by
referencing the server-side linear private database as a hypercube, or by multiple
indices of reference. With the use of the Paillier encryption scheme and some
manipulation, this protocol essentially finds server-side results similar to the
Stern protocol along each dimension of reference. This section will begin with
explaining how a hypercube can be referenced. Second this section will discuss
how the structure of the query Q has changed, and lastly will describe how
Paillier ciphertexts can be manipulated so that intermediate cihpertexts can be
treated as plaintexts in an attempt to merge intermediate server-side results into
a complete server-side result that the client will be able to extract the desired
result from.
4.3.1 Referencing a Linear Database as a Hypercube
To reference a database as though it were a c-dimensional hypercube, simply
means to reference each item in the database by c indices. The linear database
containingK elements, {xi}K−1i=0 as discussed in the Stern Protocol in Section 4.2
could be termed a 1-dimensional hypercube since each element in the database
is indexed by a single index i.
This same database could be referenced by 2 indices with the possibility of
padding with ∅ entries when K < d 2√Ke2 − 1 as follows
{xi}K−1i=0 ∪ {∅i}d
2√
Ke2−1
i=K =
{
{yi0i1}d
2√
Ke−1
i0=0
}d 2√Ke−1
i1=0
where
xi = yi0i1 if i = i0d 2
√
Ke+ i1.
This is a translation of a linear database to a 2-dimensional hypercube database.
In general, any linear database can be translated to a c-dimensional hyper-
cube by the following relation
{xi}K−1i=0 ∪ {∅i}d
c√
Kec−1
i=K =
{
...
{{
yi0i1...ic−1
}d c√Ke−1
i0=0
}d c√Ke−1
i1=0
...
}d c√Ke−1
ic−1=0
where
xi = yi0i1...ic−1 if i =
c−1∑
j=0
ijd c
√
Kec−j−1
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4.3.2 The New Query Q Structure
In Section 4.2, the query was
Q = {qi}K−1i=0
but now that the database is referenced as a hypercube, that is by c indices of
reference, the structure of the query must change. Since to reference a single
element xi0i1...ic−1 from the server-side database requires 0 ≤ ij < d c
√
Ke for
all 0 ≤ j < c, then it can been seen that there will need to be cd c√Ke 0, 1
indicators. To properly index one item in the database, there will be exactly c
1s in the entire collection of indicators, that is
qi,j =
{
E (1) j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke
E (0) otherwise
and thus
Q =
{
{qij}
c√
K−1
i=0
}c−1
j=0
For example, if c = 3, c
√
K = 5, and i∗ = 101, then
Q =
 {E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(1)}{E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0)}{E(0), E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0)}

4.3.3 Encrypting Paillier Ciphertext
As seen in Section 3.2.5, the plaintext domain of the Paillier cryptosystem is
PT = ZN where ZN is the additive cyclic group on N elements, the ciphertext
domain of the Paillier cryptosystem is CT = Z∗N2 where Z∗N2 is the multiplica-
tive group on Nφ(N) = φ(p2q2) elements, and the message m ∈ PT and the
ciphertext µ ∈ CT are related by
E(m, r) = µ
= (N + 1)mrN mod N2
ZN × Z∗N → Z∗N2
where r ∈ Z∗N is chosen at random.
Since clearly Z∗N2 6= ZN a ciphertext µ cannot be encrypted, but since
Z∗N2 ∪ {0} ≡ ZN2 an additive cyclic group, a ciphertext µ could be split as
follows
µ = m0N +m1
Z∗N2 → ZN × ZN
34 CHAPTER 4. PREVIOUS PIR PROTOCOLS
and now that m0,m1 ∈ ZN = PT the ciphtertext c can be encrypted as the
pair (E (m0, r0) , E (m1, r1)) = (µ0, µ1).
Decryption of the pair (µ0, µ1) proceeds as follows to arrive at the original
message m
D (D (µ0)N +D (µ1)) = m
where
D : Z∗N2 → ZN
Using this technique of splitting, the ciphertext result of a Paillier encryption
can easily be encrypted c times.
4.3.4 Implementing
See Appendix A.2 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
GetDatabaseSize()
Description Retrieves the number of elements in the database, so
that the client can generate a query that matches the length of the
database.
Returns the number of elements in the database. K
GetNumberOfDimensions()
Description Retrieves the number of dimensions (indices) used for
indexing any given element in the private database.
Returns the number of dimensions that index any given element
in the private database. c
GetDimensionLength()
Description Retrieves the length of the dimension.
Returns the number of elements in any given dimension.
GetDataSize()
Description Retrieves the bit-length of the element with the great-
est value in the database.
Returns the suggested minimum bit-length of the client-side public-
key parameterN , disregarding the minimum suggested bit-length for
dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e (minimum 1024)
GetNumberOfSplits()
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Description Retrieves the number of pieces that the each interme-
diate result will be split into.
Returns the number of pieces each intermediate step is split into.
t = 2 (t-fold split)
2. Generate Query
Chang-Query(i∗)
Description Generates a query with one element encrypted indica-
tors as described in Section 4.3.2. Where each element is the E(0),
unless the element is at index j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke, then
the element if E(1).
Parameters
i∗ The index the client wishes to privately retrieve from the server.
Returns the private query to be sent to the server for retrieving in-
dex i∗. Q = {{qij}
c√
K−1
i=0 }c−1j=0 where qij = E(0) for j 6= b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c
mod d c√Ke and qij = E(1) for j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke
3. Process Query Against Database
Perform-Retrieval(Q, N)
Description Takes the client’s private query and processes the
query against the database.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain used in the context of the Paillier encryption scheme.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
C-Hypercube(Q, N , ν, d, index)
Description Internal method used for recursing through all the di-
mensions (indices) of reference except for the two innermost indices.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
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N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
d The distance of the current dimension from the outermost dimen-
sion.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
Two-Hypercube(Q, ν, i, index)
Description Internal method used for processing the query against
the two innermost dimensions.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
i The current element accessed in the second dimension.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the result of processing the query against the two inner-
most dimensions of the database.
Sigma(Q, ν, i, index)
Description Internal method that basically finds a Stern result
along on particular dimension of the private database instead of
the entire database as in the Stern protocol.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
i The current element accessed in the second dimension.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the result of processing the query against the innermost
dimension of the database.
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Split(σ, N)
Description Internal method which splits a single intermediate re-
sult, a result from a Sigma call so that each piece of the split may
be a valid plaintext.
Parameters
σ A result from a Sigma call.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns The value of σ split into t = 2 pieces. parts =(u, v) such
that σ = un+ v
Filter(Rs, Q, parts, ν)
Description Internal method which applies the split from the result
of processing the query on the innermost dimension to the second
innermost dimension.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database.
Q The client’s private query.
parts The pieces resulting from the call to Split.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
Returns The server-side result from processing the query against
the two innermost dimensions of the database.
C-Split(prevParts, N)
Description Internal method similar to Split, but applies to outer
dimensions. Where C is a particular dimension, c− d.
Parameters
prevParts The result from a previous call to Two-Hypercube or
C-Hypercube.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns an array of r times the length of prevParts. Splits each
of the elements in prevParts into r pieces.
C-Filter(Rs, Q, parts, ν, k, d)
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Description Internal method similar to Filter, but applies to
outer dimensions.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database.
Q The client’s private query.
parts The pieces resulting from the call to C-Split.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
i The current element accessed in this dimension.
d The distance of the current dimension from the outermost dimen-
sion.
Returns The server-side result from processing the query against
the (c− d) innermost dimension of the database.
4. Extract Result
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database. The number of elements in the array Rs is tc.
Here t = 2.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
4.4 Lipmaa Protocol
The Lipmaa protocol, introduced in [Lip04], continues with referencing the
server-side private database as a hypercube, but uses the Damg˚ard-Jurik en-
cryption scheme, a generalization of the Paillier encryption scheme, see Chap-
ter 3, for encryption of intermediate results, and since Dang˚ard-Jurik is length-
flexible, as will be seen in this section, the need to split intermediate results is
eliminated.
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4.4.1 Encrypting Damg˚ard-Jurik Ciphertext
As seen in Section 3.2.6, the plaintext domain of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosys-
tem is PT = ZNs is an additive cyclic group where s > 0 is small compared to
N , the ciphertext domain of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem is CT = Z∗Ns+1
is a multiplicative group, and the message m ∈ PT and the ciphertext µ ∈ CT
are related by
E(m, r) = µ
= gmrN
s
mod Ns+1
ZNs × Z∗N → Z∗Ns+1
where r ∈ Z∗N is chosen at random.
The Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem, a generalization of the Paillier cryptosys-
tem, boasts to be a length-flexible cryptosystem. As a length-flexible cryptosys-
tem, the bit-length of the plaintext increases with s, and s can vary so long as
every message encrypted with one value s is decrypted with the same value of
s.
Let s > 0, m ∈ PT , and E(m, r, s) = µ ∈ CT where r ∈ Z∗N . Since
µ ∈ Z∗Ns+1 = ZNs+1 , µ can be encrypted as E(µ, r, s+ 1) = µ′. Thus, µ′ can be
considered the double encryption of the plaintext m, and D(D(µ′, s+1), s) = m.
In general, a message m ∈ PT can be encrypted n times by
µn = E(...E(E(m, r0, s), r1, s+ 1)...rn−1, s+ n− 1) ∈ ZNs+n
and the plaintext m can be recovered from µn by
m = D(...D(D(µn, s+ n− 1), s+ n− 2)...s).
4.4.2 Implementing
See Appendix A.3 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
GetDatabaseSize()
Description Retrieves the number of elements in the database, so
that the client can generate a query that matches the length of the
database.
Returns the number of elements in the database. K
GetNumberOfDimensions()
Description Retrieves the number of dimensions (indices) used for
indexing any given element in the private database.
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Returns the number of dimensions that index any given element
in the private database. c
GetDimensionLength()
Description Retrieves the length of the dimension.
Returns the number of elements in any given dimension.
GetDataSize()
Description Retrieves the bit-length of the element with the great-
est value in the database.
Returns the suggested minimum bit-length of the client-side public-
key parameterN , disregarding the minimum suggested bit-length for
RSA. dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e (Minimum 1024)
GetMaximumExponent()
Description Retrieves the minimum exponent s will be used in the
protocol. The maximum exponent would be s+ c.
Returns the minimum exponent. s
2. Generate Query
Lipmaa-Query(i∗)
Description Generates a query with one element encrypted indi-
cators as described in Section 4.3.2. Where each element is the
E(0, s + c − j), unless the element is at index j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c
mod d c√Ke, then the element if E(1, s+ c− j).
Parameters
i∗ The index the client wishes to privately retrieve from the server.
Returns the private query to be sent to the server for retrieving
index i∗. Q = {{qij}
c√
K−1
i=0 }c−1j=0 where qij = E(0, s + c − j) for
j 6= b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke for j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke
3. Process Query Against Database
Perform-Retrieval(Q, N)
Description Takes the client’s private query and processes the
query against the database.
Parameters
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Q The client’s private query.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain used in the context of the Paillier encryption scheme.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
C-Hypercube(Q, N , d, index)
Description Internal method used for recursing through all the di-
mensions (indices) of reference except for the innermost indices.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN the plaintext
domain.
d The distance of the current dimension from the outermost dimen-
sion.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
One-Hypercube(Q, index, ν)
DescriptionInternal method that processes the query against a par-
ticular dimension of the database similar to the Stern protocol.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the result of processing the query against the innermost
dimension of the database.
4. Extract Result
Lipmaa-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
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Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
Chapter 5
New PIR Protocols
This chapter is somewhat misnamed in that the first three protocols lay out a
train of thought for the final protocol. However, each of the four protocols is
a variation on the existing protocols just as the Chang and Lipmaa protocols
were variations on the Stern protocol. Since the Chang protocol relies on the
Paillier encryption scheme in which the length of the plaintext is dependent
upon the length of N , involving larger plaintexts is possible but not necessar-
ily as plausible since a larger key would have to be generated. The Lipmaa
protocol and the final protocol of this chapter however use the length-flexible
encryption scheme developed by Damg˚ard-Jurik. The goal is to have a protocol
that could potentially handle plaintexts of reasonable length. The bit-length of
the operands involved in the modular exponentiation, is directly related to the
CPU time spent on a modular exponentiation. The Lipmaa protocol increases
the bit-length of the operands as it progresses through the dimensions. The
final protocol of this chapter however reduces the bit-length of the operands
as it progresses through the dimensions at the cost of increasing the number
of modular exponentiations by a factor of 2 per dimension. Through experi-
mentation, with the final protocol versus the Lipmaa protocol, it could become
apparent not only whether communication or computational complexity serves
as the greater bottleneck in producing a practical protocol, but whether or not
it is faster to perform several smaller modular exponentiations or fewer longer
modular exponentiations.
5.1 Extended Chang Protocol
The Chang protocol presented in section 4.3 can be extended to support database
records xi ∈ ZNs where s > 1 by substituting the Paillier encryption scheme
with the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme. The intermediate ciphertexts how-
ever will not be encrypted as in the Lipmaa protocol, but rather the ciphertext
will be encrypted in a manner similar to Chang. Considering that the Paillier
encryption scheme is the same as the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme when
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s = 1 and the number of parts was s + 1 = 2, the number of parts in this
extension of the Chang protocol will be s+ 1 as well.
5.1.1 Another Method of Encrypting Damg˚ard-Jurik Ci-
phertext
In Section 4.4.1, it was shown that a plaintext m ∈ ZNs could be encrypted as
µ = E(m, s) where E is the encryption function of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption
scheme, and that the ciphertext µ ∈ Z∗Ns+1 can be encrypted once more as µ′ =
E(µ, s+1). The plaintextm can be easily retrieved through double decryption by
m = D(D(µ′, s+1), s). However, in Section 4.3.3 it was seen that a plaintextm ∈
ZN could be doubly encrypted by splitting the intermediate ciphertext µ ∈ Z∗N2
into two parts such that µ = m0N+m1, and the pair (µ0, µ1) = (E(m0), E(m1))
where E is the ecryption function of the Paillier encryption scheme. From this
doubly encrypted pair (µ0, µ1) the original message m could be recovered by
m = D(D(µ0) + D(µ1)). This method used in Section 4.3.3 to doubly encrypt
a plaintext can be applied to the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme. Let the
plaintext m ∈ ZNs and the resulting ciphertext µ = E(m, s) ∈ ZNs+1 , then this
ciphertext can be split as follows
µ =
s∑
i=0
miN
s−i
and each mi for 0 ≤ i ≤ s can be encrypted as µi = E(mi), so from the
(s+ 1)-tuple (µ0, µ1, ...µs) the original plaintext can be retrieved by
m = D
(
s∑
i=0
D(mi, s)Ns−i
)
5.1.2 Implementing
See Appendix B.1 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
See Section 4.3.4 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, and GetDataSize
GetNumberOfParts()
Description Retrieves the number of pieces that the each interme-
diate result will be split into.
Returns the number of pieces each intermediate step is split into.
t = s+ 1
GetMaximumExponent()
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Description Retrieves the maximum exponent s will be used in the
protocol.
Returns the maximum exponent. s
2. Generate Query
See Section 4.3.4 for Chang-Query.
3. Process Query Against Database
Perform-Retrieval(Q, N)
Description Takes the client’s private query and processes the
query against the database.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain used in the context of the Paillier encryption scheme.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
See Section 4.3.4 for C-Hypercube, Two-Hypercube, Sigma,
Filter, and C-Filter and override the C-Split and Split with
the following.
C-Split(prevParts, N)
Description Internal method similar to Split, but applies to outer
dimensions. Where C is a particular dimension, c− d.
Parameters
prevParts The result from a previous call to Two-Hypercube or
C-Hypercube.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns an array of t = s+1 times the length of prevParts. parts
each of the elements in prevParts into t pieces.
Split(σ, N)
Description Internal method which parts a single intermediate re-
sult, a result from a Sigma call so that each piece of the split may
be a valid plaintext.
Parameters
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σ A result from a Sigma call.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns The value of σ split into t = s + 1 pieces. parts =(u, v)
such that σ =
∑s
i=0 uiN
s−i
4. Extract Result
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database. The number of elements in the array Rs is tc.
Here t = s+ 1.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
5.2 Generalized Chang Protocol
The Extended Chang protocol increased the possible bit-length of the plaintexts
in the private server-side database without increasing the bit-length of the N ,
but at the expense of extra parts which translates to a factor of s−1 more bits.
This generalization of the Chang protocol considers how to reduce the number of
parts while maintaining the increase in the potential length of plaintexts made
possible by the Extended Chang protocol.
5.2.1 Reducing the Number of Parts
As mentioned, Section 4.4.1 provided a reasonable method of encrypting Damg˚ard-
Jurik ciphertext once more, but as in Section 5.1.1 there exists other ways to
encrypt Damg˚ard-Jurik ciphertext. However, there is no need to split interme-
diate ciphertexts into s + 1 parts. When a ciphertext µ = E(m, s) ∈ Z∗Ns+1 ,
where m ∈ ZNs is the plaintext, is split into s + 1 parts (m0,m1, ...ms), each
part mi ∈ ZN for all 0 ≤ i ≤ s, but ZN is a small subset of ZNs when s > 1.
Through simple algebra it can be proven that for all ` such that 0 ≤ ` ≤ s− 1
there exists {xi}si=` and {yj}sj=0 such that
s∑
i=`
xi ·Ns−i =
s∑
j=0
yj ·Ns−j
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where x` ∈ ZNs−` and xi,yj ∈ ZN for ` < i ≤ s and 0 ≤ ` ≤ s. With
this relation, it can easily be seen that the number of parts can be reduced to
t = s− `+ 1.
5.2.2 Implementing
See Appendix B.2 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
See Section 4.3.4 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, and GetDataSize
GetNumberOfParts()
Description Retrieves the number of pieces that the each interme-
diate result will be split into.
Returns the number of pieces each intermediate step is split into.
t ≤ s+ 1
See Section 5.1.2 for GetMaximumExponent.
2. Generate Query
See Section 4.3.4 for Chang-Query.
3. Process Query Against Database
See Section 5.1.2 for Chang-Perform-Retrieval and override C-
Split and Split with the following.
C-Split(prevParts, N)
Description Internal method similar to Split, but applies to outer
dimensions. Where C is a particular dimension, c− d.
Parameters
prevParts The result from a previous call to Two-Hypercube or
C-Hypercube.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns an array of t ≤ s times the length of prevParts. Splits
each of the elements in prevParts into t pieces.
Split(σ, N)
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Description Internal method which splits a single intermediate re-
sult, a result from a Sigma call so that each piece of the split may
be a valid plaintext.
Parameters
σ A result from a Sigma call.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns The value of σ split into t ≤ s pieces. parts =(u, v) such
that σ =
∑s
i=` uiN
s−i
4. Extract Result
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database. The number of elements in the array Rs is tc.
Here t ≤ s.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
5.3 Chang Protocol with Pre-Split Elements
The Extended and Generalized Chang protocol expanded the possible bit-length
of the plaintext records in the server’s private linear database by using the
Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme with s > 1, but modular arithmetic is an
operation that becomes more expensive as the operators increase. This section
considers another means of privately retrieving plaintexts of greater length with-
out increasing the bit-length of the operators involved in modular arithmetic.
5.3.1 Pre-Splitting Elements
Consider that the query Q = {{qij}c−1i=0}d
c√
Ke
j=0 as described in Section 4.3. Since
Paillier’s encryption scheme is semantically secure, the server has a 1K chance of
guessing which entry in the database the client is trying to retrieve. If this query
was used on several similar databases, where databases are similar if a query
can be generated to satisfy the server-side parameters of all of the databases,
then the server could still have a 1K chance of guessing which entry the client
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received from all the databases, even though the client is retrieving the same
entry from each database because the server only has a 1K chance of guessing
which item in the database that the query Q refers to. This suggests query
reusability may not be a security risk. If query reusability is not a security risk,
then if a database had entries in which the bit-length of the longest entry was
sdlog2Ne, where N is the public-key parameter of the client generated key pair
for the Paillier encryption scheme, then each entry in the database could be
split into s parts, creating s similar databases. The query generated for one of
these server-side databases, using the the key pair previously mentioned, could
be reused s times for execution on each of the s similar databases. The results
from each of the s similar databases will then have to be concatenated on the
client-sde after each result extraction. At this time it is not certain whether
query reusability is as secure as s unique queries.
5.3.2 Implementing
See Appendix B.3 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
See Section 4.3.4 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, GetNumberOfParts and Get-
DataSize
2. Generate Query
See Section 4.3.4 for Chang-Query.
3. Process Query Against Database
See Section 4.3.4 for Chang-Perform-Retrieval and override
Sigma, Split and Filter with the following.
Sigma(Q, ν, i, index)
Description Internal method that basically finds a Stern result
along on particular dimension of the private database instead of
the entire database as in the Stern protocol. However, the database
elements have been split into 2 parts, so a pair will be returned.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
i The current element accessed in the second dimension.
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index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the result of processing the query against the innermost
dimension of the database, a pair.
Split(σ, N)
Description Internal method which splits a single intermediate re-
sult, a result from a Sigma call so that each piece of the split may
be a valid plaintext.
Parameters
σ A result from a Sigma call.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN is the plaintext
domain.
Returns The value of σ split into 2t = 4 pieces. parts =((u0, v0),
(u1, v1)) such that σ0 = u0n+ v0 and σ1 = u1n+ v1
Filter(Rs, Q, parts, ν)
Description Internal method which applies the parts from the re-
sult of processing the query on the innermost dimension as the sec-
ond innermost dimension.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database.
Q The client’s private query.
parts The pieces resulting from the call to Split.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
Returns The server-side result from processing the query against
the two innermost dimensions of the database.
4. Extract Result
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
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Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database. The number of elements in the array Rs is tc+1.
Here t = 2.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
5.4 A Collaboration of the Chang and Lipmaa
Protocols
The Extended and Generalized Chang and the Lipmaa protocols used the
Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme to increase the possible length of the plain-
text records in the server-side private linear database, but the Extended and
Generalized Chang held s constant and did not use the full plaintext space
for encrypting intermediate ciphertexts, and the Lipmaa protocol increased s
to accomodate encryption of intermediate ciphertexts which led to more com-
putational complexity when considering that not all modular exponentiation
operations have the same computational complexity. The following protocol is
a collaboration in the sense that it uses the ideas of splitting as presented in the
Chang protocol and adjustment of the ciphertext, by changing the value of s at
each dimension of the hypercube, as presented in the Lipmaa protocol.
5.4.1 Using the Full Plaintext Domain
Both parts in the Chang protocol, m0,m1 ∈ ZN , and since ZN is the plaintext
domain PT , it could be said that PT is fully used. The Extended and Genral-
ized Chang protocols however do not fully utilize PT unless the Damg˚ard-Jurik
encryption scheme is equivalent to the Paillier encryption scheme, that is s = 1.
First, consider the splitting of an intermediate Damg˚ard-Jurik ciphertext
µ ∈ Z∗Ns+1 as described in 5.1.1 as
µ =
s∑
i=0
miN
s−i
Each mi ∈ ZN , and ZN becomes a much smaller subset of ZNs , the plaintext
domain PT of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme, as s increases, which is
an under-utilization of the Damg˚ard-Jurik PT .
Now, consider the splitting of an intermediate Damg˚ard-Jurik ciphertext
µ ∈ Z∗Ns+1 as described in 5.2.1 as
µ =
s∑
i=`
mi ·Ns−i
where 0 ≤ ` ≤ s − 1. Obviously, m0 ∈ ZN for all valid choices of `. It can
be shown that mi ∈ ZN for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, and that m` ∈ ZNs−` . Thus,
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if ` = s − 1 ⇒ t = 2, then m1 ∈ ZNs which is a full utilization of potential
plaintexts, but sincem0 under-utilizes PT , this shows that even the Generalized
Chang protocol will under-utilize PT when encrypting parts from intermediate
ciphertexts.
Since the number of bits transferred from the server to the client was the
least in the Generalized Chang protocol when the t = 2, not to mention the
number of encryptions was less, let t = 2. Consider splitting an intermediate
Damg˚ard-Jurik ciphertext µ ∈ Z∗Ns+1 in to 2 parts of potentially equal bit-length
µ = m0Nd
s+1
2 e +m1
Notice m0,m1 ∈ Z
Nd
s+1
2 e
. The Lipmaa protocol increased the value of s so that
an intermediate ciphertext could be encrypted. Now consider decreasing s to
match PT , that is the encryption of the parts m0 and m1 should be the pair
(µ0, µ1) =
(
E
(
m0,
⌈
s+ 1
2
⌉)
, E
(
m1,
⌈
s+ 1
2
⌉))
As an example, let c = 5, and s0 = 17, then the progression of adjustments to
PT and CT provided by the length-flexibility of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption
scheme would be
(µ0, µ1) =
(
E
(
m0,
⌈
17 + 1
2
⌉
= 9
)
, E
(
m1,
⌈
17 + 1
2
⌉
= 9
))
(µ′0, µ
′
1) =
(
E
(
m0,
⌈
9 + 1
2
⌉
= 5
)
, E
(
m1,
⌈
9 + 1
2
⌉
= 5
))
(µ′′0 , µ
′′
1) =
(
E
(
µ′0,
⌈
5 + 1
2
⌉
= 3
)
, E
(
µ′1,
⌈
5 + 1
2
⌉
= 3
))
(µ′′′0 , µ
′′′
1 ) =
(
E
(
µ′′0 ,
⌈
3 + 1
2
⌉
= 2
)
, E
(
µ′′1 ,
⌈
3 + 1
2
⌉
= 2
))
(µ′′′′0 , µ
′′′′
1 ) =
(
E
(
µ′′′0 ,
⌈
2 + 1
2
⌉
= 2
)
, E
(
µ′′′1 ,
⌈
2 + 1
2
⌉
= 2
))
Since modular exponentiations increase in computational complexity with
respect to the length of the operands, s = 17 is most likely impractical, con-
sidering that dlog2Ne ≥ 1024 bits, but taking a smaller example with c = 3
(if c = 2, then the Collaboration protocol similar to the Chang protocol with a
larger N) and K = 1000, while the Lipmaa protocol and the Collaboration of
Chang and Lipmaa protocol will have 1000 modular exponentiations with a base
having sdlog2Ne bits while operating on the innermost dimension, the Lipmaa
will have 100 modular exponentiations with a base having (s+ 1)dlog2Ne bits
and the Collaboration will have 200 modular exponentiations with a base hav-
ing d s+12 edlog2Ne bits while operating on the second innermost dimension. If
all exponentiations were equal, then there would be an obvious savings in using
Lipmaa over the Collaboration, but because all modular exponentiations are
not equally complex, there is reason to consider that the Collaboration may be
more efficient since the bit-length of the base nearly halves for each dimension
of processing.
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5.4.2 Implementing
See Appendix B.4 for pseudo-code implementation details.
1. Acquire Server Parameters
See Section 4.3.4 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, GetNumberOfParts and Get-
DataSize
See Section 4.4.2 for GetMaximumExponent.
2. Generate Query
Collaboration-Query(i∗)
Description Generates a query with one element encrypted indi-
cators as described in Section 4.3.2. Where each element is the
E(0, d s−12c−i−1 e), unless the element is at index j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke,
then the element if E(1, d s−12c−i−1 e).
Parameters
i∗ The index the client wishes to privately retrieve form the server.
Returns the private query to be sent to the server for retrieving
index i∗. Q = {{qi}
c√
K−1
i=0 }c−1i=0 where qij = E(0, d s−12c−i−1 e) for j 6=
b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c mod d
c
√
Ke and qij = E(1, d s−12c−i−1 e) for j = b i∗d c√Kec−i−1 c
mod d c√Ke
3. Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
See Section 4.3.4 for Chang-Perform-Retrieval and override C-
Hypercube, Two-Hypercube with the following.
C-Hypercube(Q, N , ν, d, index)
Description Internal method used for recursing through all the di-
mensions (indices) of reference except for the two inner-most indices.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN the plaintext
domain.
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ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
d The distance of the current dimension from the outermost dimen-
sion.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the server-side result after processing the query against
the private database. Rs
Two-Hypercube(Q, N , ν, index)
Description Internal method used for processing the query against
the two innermost dimensions.
Parameters
Q The client’s private query.
N The modulus of the plaintext domain, where ZN the plaintext
domain.
ν The modulus of the ciphertext domain, where Zν is the ciphertext
domain.
index The cummulative index from combining the indexes from
within, the previous dimensions.
Returns the result of processing the query against the two inner-
most dimensions of the database.
4. Extract Result
Collaboration-Extract-Result(Rs)
Description Extracts the plaintext result of the query processed
against the private database from the server-side result. The plain-
text result should be the i∗ entry of the private database.
Parameters
Rs The server-side result from processing the private query against
the database. The number of elements in the array Rs is tc.
Here t ≤ s.
Returns The plaintext result which should be the i∗ entry of the
private database.
Chapter 6
Comparisons
In Stern[Ste98], Chang[Cha04], and Lipmaa[Lip04], the primary goal of each
protocol was to reduce the amount of communication. That is, each proto-
col was deemed an improvement over previous protocols only if the amount
of communication between the client and server for the duration of the entire
protocol was lower. It will be seen by example that the protocol presented by
Lipmaa[Lip04] did not beat out Chang[Cha04] in the realm of communication
all the time. Considering a communication channel that will support a consis-
tent 28.8Kb/s, which is simply a cheap, if not obsolete, dial-up modem running
at maximum capacity, the time spent on communication could potentially be
quite negligible compared to the time spent on computations. Thus, the better
protocol should be the protocol that performs the least number of operations,
if modular exponentiation operations are expensive for large moduli, which in
most cases is the opposite of the protocol with the least number of bits commu-
nicated.
The experiments performed and discussed in this chapter use the multi-
presion package java.math.BigInteger. Multi-presicion packages are quite
efficient to the extent that using this package to increase the readability of the
code, will barely, if at all, hinder the performance of the protocols. Through
experimentation, it can be seen that the time spent performing a modPow oper-
ation provided in java.math.BigInteger increases polynomially as the length
of the operands increases. Figure 6.1 shows that the average length of time,
with a sample size of 20, the time spent on a modular exponentiation grows
exponentially with bit-length. The same test was performed for modular multi-
plication using multiply followed by mod, and it was found that this operation
combination takes under 6 milliseconds.
6.1 Theoretical Comparison
Since the Chang protcol is strongly limited to the bit-length of the key, a fair
comparison of the three published protocols, Stern [Ste98], Chang [Cha04], and
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Lipmaa [Lip04] would be to limit the length of the data to dlog2Ne, or in
terms of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem maintain s = 1. The new protocol,
the Collaboration of Chang and Lipmaa Protocol, introduced in this thesis
in Section 5.4 was devised to use the length-flexibilty of the Damg˚ard-Jurik
cryptosystem for the retrieval of data larger than dlog2Ne, and thus is discussed
separately in comparison to the latest published protocol, Lipmaa. Comparisons
are made assuming dlog2Ne = 1024. While it is suggested for commercial
applications to use at least 2048, 1024 bits is still secure enough for this kind of
protocols.
6.1.1 Data with Bit-Length Less Than dlog2Ne
From the descriptions of the client-side phase of query generation in Chapters
4 and 5, the number of encryptions necessary and the number of bits in the
resulting query can be determined to be as listed in Table 6.1, and from the
descriptions of the client-side phase of extracting the result in Chapters 4 and
5, the number of decryptions necessary can be determined to be as listed in
Table 6.1. The same can also be determined from the descriptions of the server-
side processing of the query in Chapters 4 and 5. The number of modular
exponentiations and the number of bits sent is listed in Table 6.2.
As was agreed in [Cha04] and [Lip04], the more dimensions the smaller the
query which results in less client to server communication as can be shown in
Figure 6.3 with the dlog2Ne = 1024. The smaller query also had proportionally
fewer encryption operations to obtain it, see Figure 6.2. From these figures, it is
easy to assume that more dimensions is better because the greater the number
of dimensions the less time spent on both computation and communication, but
this only covers the phases of Query Generation and Client Communicating to
Server.
In section 5.1, it was conjectured that the Extension to the Chang Protocol
was not an improvement, but rather serves as a stepping stone to the Collabo-
ration of Chang and Lipmaa Protocol. To assert that conjecture as true, notice
in Figure 6.4, that the number of decryptions increases polynomially faster than
any of the other Chang-based protocols, except Pre-Split, so the Extended
Protocol will only be dragged along through the experiments to further assert
the original conjecture as true. Figure 6.4 shows the number of decryptions in-
creases with the number of dimensions and this number of decryptions is roughly
proportional to the increase in number of bits sent from the server to the client,
see Table 6.3. This would suggest that increasing the number of dimensions
hinders the performance of the protocol, but the number of encryptions and
bits sent from the client to the server outweigh the number of decryptions and
bits sent from server to client vastly, especially as the size of the database K
increases, so the time spent in the extraction phase could potentially be negli-
gible.
The last phase to consider is the server-side processing of the private query
on the private database. Figure 6.5 shows that as the dimensions increase,
the number of modular exponentiations increases, and the Chang protocol in-
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Encryptions Decryptions Bits Sents
Stern K 1 Kdlog2me
Chang c c
√
K
∑c−1
i=0 2
i 2c c
√
Kdlog2Ne
Extended c c
√
K
∑c−1
i=0 (s+ 1)
i (s+ 1)c c
√
Kdlog2Ne
Generalized c c
√
K
∑c−1
i=0 r
i (s+ 1)c c
√
Kdlog2Ne
Pre-Split c c
√
K
∑c
i=0 2
i 2c c
√
Kdlog2Ne
Lipmaa c c
√
K
∑c−1
i=0 2
i (
∑c
i=1 s+ i)
c
√
Kdlog2Ne
Collaboration c c
√
K
∑c−1
i=0 2
i
(∑c
i=1
s−1
2c−i + 2
)
c
√
Kdlog2Ne
Table 6.1: Client-Side Operation Comparison
Exponentiations Bits Sents
Stern K dlog2Me
Chang
∑c−1
i=0 2
i c
√
K
c−i
2cdlog2Ne
Extended
∑c−1
i=0 (s+ 1)
i c
√
K
c−i
(s+ 1)cdlog2Ne
Generalized
∑c−1
i=0 r
i c
√
K
c−i
(s+ 1)rc−1dlog2Ne
Pre-Split
∑c−1
i=0 2
i+1 c
√
K
c−i
2c+1dlog2Ne
Lipmaa
∑c
i=1
c
√
K
i
(s+ c)dlog2Ne
Collaboration
∑c−1
i=0 2
i c
√
K
c−i
2cd s+12c +
∑c−1
i=0
1
2i edlog2Ne
Table 6.2: Server-Side Operation Comparison
c Stern Chang-based (t = 2) Lipmaa
1 2056 - -
2 - 8224 3074
3 - 16448 4096
4 - 32896 5124
5 - 65792 6152
Table 6.3: The number of bits sent from the server to the client is independent
of the size of the database; however, since the number of bits sent from the client
to server decreases with dimension, a reasonable tactic would be to increase the
dimensions of reference which will increase the server to client communication.
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creases much faster than the Lipmaa protocol because the operation of splitting
the intermediate results, doubles the number of modular exponentiations per di-
mension. The number of server-side modular exponentiation operations is far
greater than the number of encryptions during client-side query generation, that
unlike with the discussion of the extracting the result phase, this phase cannot
be considered negligible. This suggests that if the client and server have the
same computational power, that the increase in dimensions is a hinderance on
the performance. However, if the server is much more computationally inclined
than the client, and can dedicate those resources to the single client, then the
time spent on client-side query generation and server-side processing of query
could be comparable.
Communicationally, since most of the protocols communicate less than
28.8Kb, the total communication time for each protocol is mere seconds. How-
ever, the Stern protocol may be several seconds. Computationally, for the client-
side, a Chang-based protocol with 2 parts and higher dimensions will be faster
given the number of server-side elements K is not trivially small, see [Cha04].
If the time to encrypt and decrypt larger operands is small, then the Lipmaa
protocol could be computationally faster, since the number of decryptions only
increases linearly rather than exponentially with the number of dimensions.
Computationally, for the server-side, the Stern protocol is faster since the num-
ber of modular exponentiations is equal to the number elements in the private
database K, and for all other protocols, the number of modular exponentiations
is greater than K.
6.1.2 Data with Bit-Length Greater Than dlog2Ne
Since the number of encryptions performed during client-side query generation
and the number of bits sent from the client to the server, that is the number
of bits in the private query, are proportional, the bits sent from the client to
server is a more accurate indicator of the computational complexity of the client-
side query generation phase because not all encryptions in the query generation
phase of the Lipmaa and Collaboration of Chang and Lipmaa protocols are
equal. The Lipmaa protocol calls for each column of the private query matrix
to increase s by 1 and the Collaboration protocol calls for each column of the
private query matrix to decrease s by roughly half per column. So as one moves
along the columns of the private query during generation, one will notice that
the encryptions become gradually longer in Lipmaa, and significantly smaller
in Collaboration. As can be seen in Figure 6.7, Lipmaa queries are significantly
larger than Collaboration queries for large data. The figure does not display
the comparison in lower dimensions because for the cases where 2 ≤ c ≤ 3 are
roughly the same for s < 5.
The number of bits sent from the server to the client, is a reasonable indicator
of the number of decryptions involved during client-side extraction of result.
Again the number of decryptions is outweighed by the number of encryptions
performed by the client and the number of modular exponentiations performed
by the server, so this phase is still relatively negligible except that the bit-length
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of operands involved in decryption are significantly smaller for the Collaboration
protocol than the Lipmaa, so even though there are exponentially many more
decryptions for the Collaboration protocol, this could be offset by the decryption
operations being much shorter.
The number of modular exponentiations performed by the server are the
same as in Figure 6.5, considering the Collaboration protocol as a Chang-based
protocol. This comparison is not completely accurate, for the same reasons
as client-side query generation and client-side extraction of result. The bit-
length of the operands in the modular exponentiations is not equal. While the
Collaboration protocol will have many more modular exponentiations, it will
have operations acting on much shorter operands than Lipmaa.
Computationally it is tough to say whether Collaboration or Lipmaa will
be faster. It is pretty certain that with the number of encryptions performed
by the client being equal that the Collaboration protocol will produce a query
faster because the bit-length of the operands is smaller, assuming again that as
the bit-length of the operands increases the computational complexity. Com-
municationally it easy to see that Collaboration will be faster, but since the
number of bits involved in communication is smaller than 28.8Kb, the overall
communication time for each will be mere seconds anyways.
6.2 Experimental Comparison
The following experimental results were acquired by running the source code
included with the enclosed CD with the scripts in Appendix D on Sun Blade
1500 with a UltraSPARC IIIi 1.0GHz processor and 1GB of RAM. The pro-
grams running in the background, and the users logging into the computer were
uncontrolled, but effort was made to find the least used workstations which
statisfied these specifications. All times in the tables contained in this section
are in milleseconds (1/1000s).
The architecture of the software for these protocols is such that the re-
lationship of previous protocols to later protocols is made apparent through
polymorphism. From an educational view point, this will allow others to better
understand how these protocols work. Unfortunately, the introduction of broad
generalizations can diminish the test of performance. While some protocols
should theoretically perform better and in actuality might perform better, with
the generalizations introduced this may not be the case.
The sections are broken up to compare the protocols based on the length of
data that can be retrieved. Some protocols may perform better on a database
with longer entries. Within each section, the affect of changing the dimen-
sions, or number of indices of reference, is adjusted to see how the number of
dimensions affects performance.
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c s Collaboration Lipmaa
2 3 12336 5140
3 5 24672 8224
4 9 49344 13312
5 17 98688 22616
6 33 197376 40092
Table 6.4: Due to splitting, the number of bits sent from the client increases
exponentially for the Collaboration protocol. This suggests that if the Col-
laboration will prevail over Lipmaa a larger number of dimensions could
prove to be a hinderance.
Phase Stern Chang Lipmaa
c = 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 7897 5331 5309 7699 22496 25997 23376
Process 6266 9392 19843 59190 32864 26755 17480
Extraction 1272 3797 8822 19850 2086 4488 8331
Total 15435 18520 33974 86739 57446 57240 49187
Phase Extended Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 5058 5371 6379 6147 8947 6601
Process 9399 16057 36589 11310 39786 55730
Extraction 1914 4826 9512 1960 4493 9440
Total 16371 26254 52480 19417 53226 71771
Table 6.5: K = 10, s = 1. The simple and straightforward Stern protocol
prevails with the small database size.
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6.2.1 Data with Bit-Length Less Than dlog2Ne
From Tables 6.5 and 6.6, several things can be noticed. First, the length of time
spent on extraction is clearly independent of the size of the server-side private
database. Second, the architecture of the software, that is, using a significant
amount of generalization, may not have introduced as many measurement errors
as was feared. Since the Extended andGeneralized protocols are exactly the
same as the Chang protocol when c = 2 and s = 1, and the times are roughly
the same. Third, the Lipmaa protocol, though published after the Chang
protocol was boasted an improvement, it failed to compete with the Chang
protocol. Fourth, increasing the number of dimensions is indeed a hinderance
on performance. It could be argued that 10 and 100 do not have second, third,
as well as fourth roots, so you are always acting on a database with varying
quantity of null entries, except for 100 = 102, but in the cases where c = 2 while
K = 10 and c = 4 while K = 10, the product `c = 8 will the number of null
entries being 6 for both cases. The total time for the case where c = 4 while
K = 10 is greater than the total time for the case where c = 2 and K = 10.
Thus, increasing the number of dimensions is a hinderance on performance.
6.2.2 Data with Bit-Length Less Than 2dlog2Ne
In Chapter 5, the Chang Protocol was Extended then Generalized and
then went back to the Chang to ponder whether you could reuse the client-side
generated query several times on Pre-Split entries. These variations serve as
stepping stones towards the Collaboration of Chang and Lipmaa protocol, but
these could serve as contenders for the Lipmaa protocol when s > 1. Since
these protocols were equivalent to the Chang protocol when s = 1 and the
Chang protocol outperformed the Lipmaa protocol in Section 6.2.1, there is
a reasonable likelihood that at least Pre-Split and the Generalized could
perform at least as well as the Lipmaa protocol for s > 1.
From Tables 6.7 and 6.8, it can be seen that Lipmaa still fails to compete
with the Chang-based protocols. The extraction time is low, but in general for
all of these protocols, the extraction phase has the least number of operations,
thus it is easy to have the fastest extraction time and still be the slower protocol.
The Extended, as mentioned before, begins to lose its speed very quickly.
By increasing s to 2, the Extended protocol runs nearly three times slower;
whereas, the Generalized is running roughly the same with s = 2 as it did
with s = 1. Thus, the Extended will be considered no further. The Pre-Split
did not run much faster than the Generalized, and since the security of Pre-
Split is questionable, Pre-Split protocol will be dropped from consideration
as well.
6.2.3 Data with Bit-Length Less Than 4dlog2Ne
Table 6.9 presents further evidence that Chang-based protocols out perform
Lipmaa. This reinforces that the bit-length of the operands involved in modu-
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Phase Stern Chang Lipmaa
c = 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 64444 10452 9183 9162 55651 41525 45687
Process 64417 39448 99029 195340 325089 199767 115964
Extraction 1278 3800 8834 18884 2054 4636 8374
Total 130139 53700 117046 223386 382794 245928 170025
Phase Extended Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 10741 9093 89825 14063 11531 12135
Process 41035 70227 122526 76674 158007 380851
Extraction 1976 4442 9490 1928 4586 9487
Total 53770 83762 140941 92665 174124 402473
Table 6.6: K = 100, s = 1. The larger database size significantly increased
the time spent generating a query for the Stern protocol, which indicates that
saving time by decreasing the query is a strength. Since Chang surpasses
Lipmaa, this confirms the suggestion that the impact of more decryptions is
not as significant as having a larger query.
Phase Pre-Split Lipmaa
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 5299 5316 6639 57481 64283 57561
Process 16563 29573 82561 78702 97503 90637
Extraction 6311 15755 35261 2027 445 8398
Total 28173 50644 124461 138210 166241 156596
Phase Extended Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 17802 19132 23498 22593 25830 23389
Process 24859 55193 172399 30219 122618 175816
Extraction 5599 19164 55985 4198 9783 20885
Total 48260 93489 251882 57010 158231 220090
Table 6.7: K = 10, s = 2. Pre-Split and Generalized are essentially the
same protocol. The Chang-based protcol once again surpasses the later pub-
lished Lipmaa protocol.
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lar exponentiation affects the computational complexity of the operation. This
also suggests that the polynomial growth in the complexity of the modular ex-
ponentiation operation surpasses the polynomially increasing number of parts to
be encrypted during the application of the private query on the private database
in a Chang-based protocol.
6.2.4 Comparisons With Collaboration
The Collaboration of Chang and Lipmaa protocol should provide relatively
good performance when s is significantly large. Also, since it was seen that
increasing the number of dimensions is more of hinderance than a help, only
cases where c = 2 will be considered.
Looking at Tables 6.10, it can be seen that when s = 3, the Collaboration
protocol surpasses the Generalized protocol. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that the Collaboration protocol is the most efficient Chang-based protocol
when s is large. As in all previous experiments, the Chang-based protocol
surpasses the Lipmaa protocol. As s increases, however, the Lipmaa perfor-
mance to Collaboration performance ratio slowly decreases, but the time
spent retrieving data increases much faster to the point where large s becomes
unreasonable for the computations.
6.3 Conclusions and Future Work
The hierarchical architecture of both the Cryptosystem and Private Information
Retrieval libraries add value as a means for conveying the relationships of newer
cryptosystems and protocols to the early cryptosystems and protocols so that
the derivations of one cryptosystem or protocol from another is more apparent.
However, this did increase the risk for experimental error. It could be beneficial
to verify the results found in this thesis with software architected to contain
little to no generalizations.
It was shown that larger operands in modular exponentiations do increase
the computational complexity of the protocol. Recent advances have created
chips that contain a cryptographic coprocessors that can perform faster mod-
ular exponentiations with larger operands via the Montgomery Fast Modular
Exponentiation algorithm embedded in the coprocessor. This may prove useful
in sending larger amounts of data. Since very few files of any meaning are under
a megabyte.
Experiments were not performed to prove that the time spent on commu-
nication was small, but in future experiments, the networking could be added,
though it is highly doubtful that such experiments would disprove what was
conjectured here. Communication will only become an issue once these proto-
cols can perform computations on on data entries exceeding maybe a megabyte,
but with more and more consumers leasing high speed connections, it is still
doubtful that communication will be a bottleneck for such protocols.
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Furthermore, [Cha04] and [Lip04] introduced referencing the database as a
hypercube to decrease the communication, but at the cost of even more time
spent on computation. Since computations consume nearly all of the time spent
executing the protocol, this finding produces another reason to not focus so much
on reduction of communication.
The Chang protocol with Pre-Split database entries could be a potential
means of increasing the amount of data communicated by the ability to send a
single query to retrieve an entry one kilobit at a time, and pipelining the execu-
tion of server-side processing on the next chunk with the client-side extraction of
the most recently received chunk. Even the possibilty of the server performing
multiple processing phases on contiguous chunks could speed up the process of
retrieving larger data privately, but it would have to be proven that reuse of a
query is indeed secure.
If attempting to find the protocol and the parameters that could accom-
plish ”practical” PIR in one CPU minute, that would be a tough decision. A
”practical” scheme could require the data be of a certain size, the database be a
certain size, or a balance of the two. From hypotheses and experiments, there is
no doubt that the number of dimensions should be fixed at c = 2. If the goal is
to retrieve from a larger database and the data length is free, then the Chang
protocol (or Generalized or Collaboration) with K = 100 and s = 1 with
N = 1024 will provide ”practical” PIR. However, if the length of the data is
more important, then the Collaboration protocol with K = 9 and s = 3
while N = 1024 would be practical. Regardless, the value K is still significantly
small, considering an online music source such as iTunes c©provides access to
over 2 million songs.
Eventually there will be a 100-fold increase in the CPU power available to
a user. As CPU power increases, the ability to break an N -bit encryption
increases. Assuming, for simplicity, that the bit-length necessary to create a
nearly invulnerable encryption increases directly with the CPU power, which is
not necessarily true, then N will increase from 1024 bits to 12.8kB. A 12.8kB
file could be a length text file or a short PDF. That PDF could be a academic
journal article, and it could be retrieved with the Chang protocol. Just by
setting s = 2, the length of the data retrieved could be as long as 25.6kB.
The problem of Private Information Retrieval consists of much more than
was defined in Chapter 1. The problem consists of having to read every piece of
data in the database an equal number of times and the improbability of reducing
computational complexity because such a reduction in complexity would most
likely lead to a reduction in security.
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Phase Pre-Split Lipmaa
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 10330 9412 9829 143513 110511 113492
Process 89570 176090 339599 779757 613612 501879
Extraction 6312 15762 36561 2025 4510 8381
Total 106221 201264 385989 925295 728633 623752
Phase Extended Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 42223 33767 33862 57426 44730 46242
Process 103986 204334 448069 193486 450608 1172553
Extraction 5997 18207 55694 4445 10045 20954
Total 152206 256308 537625 255357 505383 1239749
Table 6.8: K = 100, s = 2. The Extended protocol was presented as a stepping
stone to Generalized and then Collaboration, and this protocol will be
considered no further as the complexity is increasing rapidly.
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K=10
Phase Lipmaa Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 118030 132292 118527 57791 64587 57472
Process 148064 239979 267822 62341 277336 400020
Extraction 2032 4481 8340 7689 17361 37004
Total 268126 376752 394689 127821 359284 494496
Phase Lipmaa Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 210465 237269 208484 116845 136122 117068
Process 239715 473152 594116 110875 528578 801187
Extraction 2039 4559 8369 11745 27072 59180
Total 452219 714980 810969 239465 691772 977435
K=100
Phase Lipmaa Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 292066 218687 233184 144555 108291 115252
Process 1520228 1329336 1379164 351863 963495 2634033
Extraction 2062 4526 8385 7558 17350 36806
Total 1814356 1552549 1620733 503976 108136 2786091
Phase Lipmaa Generalized
c = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Query 580101 395996 417609 312427 223578 233989
Process 2536055 2368644 2914973 58233 1779283 5062250
Extraction 2045 4508 8659 11811 27172 58437
Total 3118201 2769148 3341241 907471 2030033 5354676
Table 6.9: K = 10, s = 3, K = 10, s = 4, K = 100, s = 3, and K = 100, s = 4.
This is verification that many smaller modular exponentiations is faster than
fewer larger modular exponentiations.
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Phase Lipmaa
s= 3 5 9 17
Query 118557 341786 1509086 7685477
Process 148439 373942 1079521 3526029
Extraction 14061 38875 113068 659771
Total 281057 754603 2701675 11871277
Phase Collaboration
s= 3 5 9 17
Query 40578 134243 621103 7518219
Process 46014 110876 358451 1638035
Extraction 5278 10623 28503 229869
Total 91870 255742 1008057 9386123
Table 6.10: Lipmaa vs. Collaboration with K=10 and c=2. The Collabora-
tion protocol shows to be much faster, and the difference shows the true affect
of reducing the bit-length of the operands involved in modular exponentiations.
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Appendix A
Previous PIR
Implementation Details
A.1 Stern Protocol
See Section 4.2.2 for method headers.
A.1.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
GetDatabaseSize()
1 return K
GetDataSize()
1 return dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e
A.1.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
Stern-Query(i∗)
1 Q[K]
2 for i← 0 to K
3 do if i = i∗
4 then Q[i]← Encrypt(1)
5 else Q[i]← Encrypt(0)
6 return Q
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A.1.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
Stern-Perform-Retrieval(Q,m)
1 Rs
2 for i← 0 to K
3 do Rs = (Rs ·Q[i]db[i]) mod m
4 return Rs
A.1.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
Stern-Extract-Result(Rs)
1 return Decrypt(Rs)
A.2 Chang Protocol
See Section 4.3.4 for method headers.
A.2.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
GetDatabaseSize()
1 return K
GetNumberOfDimensions()
1 return c
GetDimensionLength()
1 return d c√Ke
GetDataSize()
1 return dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e
GetNumberOfParts()
1 return 2
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A.2.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
Chang-Query(i∗)
1 Q[c, c
√
K]
2 for i← 0 to c
3 do for j ← 0 to c√K
4 do if j = (i ∗ /( c√K)c−i−1) mod ( c√K)
5 then Q[i, j] = Encrypt(1)
6 else Q[i, j] = Encrypt(0)
7 return Q
A.2.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
Perform-Retrieval(Q[][], n)
1 return C-Hypercube(Q,n, n2, 0, 0)
C-Hypercube(Q[][], n,m, d, index)
1 Rs[numSplitsc−d−1
2 if c− d = 2
3 then Rs ← Two-Hypercube(Q,n,m, d+ 1, index · ( c
√
K)d)
4 else for k ← 0 to c√K
5 do prevParts← N −Hypercube(Q,n,m, d+ 1, index · ( c√K)d)
6 currParts← N − Split(prevParts, n)
7 Rs ← N − Filter(Rs, Q, currParts,m, k, d)
8 return Rs
Two-Hypercube(Q[][], n,m, index)
1 Rs[r]
2 for i← 0 to c√K
3 do σ ← Sigma(Q[0],m, i, index)
4 parts← Split(σ, n)
5 Rs ← Filter(Rs, Q[1][i], parts,m)
6 return Rs
Sigma(Q[],m, i, index)
1 σ ← 1
2 for i← 0 to length(Q)
3 do σ ← σ ·Q[i]db[index+d· c
√
K+i·( c√K)2]
4 return σ
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Split(σ, n)
1 Rparts[0]← σ/n
2 Rparts[1]← σ mod n
3 return Rparts
Filter(Rs, Q, parts[],m)
1 Rs[0] = Rs[0] ·Qparts[0] mod m
2 Rs[1] = Rs[1] ·Qparts[1] mod m
3 return Rs
C-Split(prevParts[], n)
1 Rparts[length(prevParts) ∗ 2]
2 for i← 0 to length(prevParts)
3 do Rparts[i ∗ 2]← prevParts[i]/n
4 Rparts[i ∗ 2 + 1]← prevParts[i] mod n
5 return Rparts
C-Filter(Rs[], Q[][], parts[],m, k, d)
1 for i← 0 to length(parts)
2 do Rs[i]← Rs[i] ·Q[c− d− 1][k]parts[i] mod m
3 return Rs
A.2.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs[2c−1])
1 Rl ← Rs
2 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
3 while length(Rc) > 0
4 do for i← 0 to length(Rc)
5 do Rc[i]← Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ 2]) · n+Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ 2 + 1])
6 Rl ← Rc
7 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
8 return Decrypt(Rl[0])
A.3 Lipmaa Protocol
See Section 4.4.2 for method headers.
A.3.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
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GetDatabaseSize()
1 return K
GetNumberOfDimensions()
1 return c
GetDimensionLength()
1 return d c√Ke
GetDataSize()
1 return dlog2max{xi}K−1i=0 e
GetMaximumExponent()
1 return s
A.3.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
Lipmaa-Query(index)
1 Q[c, c
√
K]
2 for i← 0 to c
3 do for j ← 0 to c√K
4 do if i ∗ n+ j = index
5 then Q[i, j]← Encrypt(1, i)
6 else Q[i, j]← Encrypt(0, i)
7 return Q
A.3.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
Lipmaa-Perform-Retrieval(Q[][], n)
1 return N-Hypercube(Q,n, 0, 0)
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N-Hypercube(Q[][], n, d, index)
1 if (c− d) = 1
2 then Rs ← One-Hypercube(Q, index, n2)
3 else Rs ← 1
4 m← ns−d−1
5 for i← 0 to logcK
6 do Rp ← N-Hyprercube(Q,n, d+ 1, index, (i · (logcK)d)
7 Rs ← Rs ·Q[c− d− 1]Rp mod m
8 return Rs
One-Hypercube(Q[][], index,m)
1 Rs ← 1
2 for i← 0 to logcK
3 do Rs ← Rs ·Q[0][i]db[i·(logcK)
c−1+index]
4 return Rs
A.3.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
Lipmaa-Extract-Result(Rs)
1 for i← c to 0
2 do Rs ← Decrypt(Rs, i)
3 return Rs
Appendix B
New PIR Implementation
Details
B.1 Extended Chang Protocol
See Section 5.1.2 for method headers.
B.1.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
See Appendix A.2 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, and GetDataSize
GetNumberOfParts()
1 return s
GetMaximumExponent()
1 return s
B.1.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
See Appendix A.2 for Chang-Query.
B.1.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
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Chang-Perform-Retrieval(Q[][], n)
1 return C-Hypercube(Q,n, ns+1, 0, 0)
See Appendix A.2 for C-Hypercube, Two-Hypercube, Sigma,
Filter, and C-Filter and override the C-Split and Split with
the following.
C-Split(prevParts, n)
1 Rparts[length(prevParts) ∗ (s+ 1)]
2 for i← 0 to length(prevParts)
3 do for j ← 0 to s+ 1
4 do Rparts[i · (s+ 1) + j]← prevParts[i] · (ns−j)−1 mod n
5 return Rparts
Split(σ, n)
1 Rparts[s+ 1]
2 for i← 0 to s+ 1
3 do Rparts[i]← σ/ns−i
4 σ ← σ mod ns−i
5 return Rparts
B.1.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs[2c−1])
1 Rl ← Rs
2 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
3 while length(Rc) > 0
4 do for i← 0 to length(Rc)
5 do for j ← 0 to s
6 do Rc[i] = Rc[i] +Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ (s+ 1) + j] · ns−j , s)
7 Rl ← Rc
8 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
9 return Decrypt(Rl[0], s)
B.2 Generalized Chang Protocol
See Section 5.2.2 for method headers.
B.2.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
B.2. GENERALIZED CHANG PROTOCOL 85
See Appendix A.2 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, and GetDataSize
GetNumberOfParts()
1 return r
See Appendix B.1 for GetMaximumExponent.
B.2.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
See Appendix A.2 for Chang-Query.
B.2.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
See Appendix B.1 for Chang-Perform-Retrieval and override
C-Split and Split with the following.
C-Split(prevParts, n)
1 Rparts[length(prevParts) ∗ (r)]
2 for i← 0 to length(prevParts)
3 do for j ← 0 to r
4 do Rparts[i · r + j]← prevParts[i] · (ns−j)−1 mod n
5 return Rparts
Split(σ, n)
1 Rparts[r]
2 for i← 0 to r
3 do Rparts[i]← σ/ns−i−1
4 σ ← σ mod ns−i−1
5 return Rparts
B.2.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
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Chang-Extract-Result(Rs[2c−1])
1 Rl ← Rs
2 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
3 while length(Rc) > 0
4 do for i← 0 to length(Rc)
5 do for j ← 0 to r
6 do Rc[i]← Rc[i] +Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ (r) + j] · ns−j , s)
7 Rl ← Rc
8 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
9 return Decrypt(Rl[0], s)
B.3 Chang Protocol with Pre-Splitting Elements
See Section 5.3.2 for method headers.
B.3.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
See Appendix A.2 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, GetNumberOfParts and Get-
DataSize
B.3.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
See Appendix A.2 for Chang-Query.
B.3.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
See Appendix A.2 for Chang-Perform-Retrieval and override
Sigma, Split and Filter with the following.
Sigma(Q[],m, i, index)
1 σ[]← 1, 1
2 for i← 0 to length(Q)
3 do σ[0]← σ[0] ·Q[i] db[index+d·d
c√
Ke+i·(d c√Ke)2]
n
4 σ[1]← σ[1] ·Q[i]db[index+d·d c
√
Ke+i·(d c√Ke)2] mod n
5 return σ
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Split(σ, n)
1 Rparts[0]← σ[0]/n
2 Rparts[1]← σ[0] mod n
3 Rparts[2]← σ[1]/n
4 Rparts[3]← σ[1] mod n
5 return Rparts
Filter(Rs, Q, parts[],m)
1 Rs[0] = Rs[0] ·Qparts[0] mod m
2 Rs[1] = Rs[1] ·Qparts[1] mod m
3 Rs[2] = Rs[2] ·Qparts[2] mod m
4 Rs[3] = Rs[3] ·Qparts[3] mod mreturn Rs
B.3.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
Chang-Extract-Result(Rs[2c])
1 Rl ← Rs
2 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
3 while length(Rc) > 0
4 do for i← 0 to length(Rc)
5 do for j ← 0 to numSplits
6 do Rc[i]← Rc[i] +Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ (numSplits) + j] · ns−j , s)
7 Rl ← Rc
8 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
9 return Rl[0]
B.4 A Collaboration of the Chang and LipmaaPro-
tocols
See Section 5.4.2 for method headers.
B.4.1 Acquire Server Parameters
Client-Side Remote Method Invocations on Server-Side Stub
See Appendix A.2 for GetDatabaseSize, GetNumberOfDimen-
sions, GetDimensionLength, GetNumberOfParts and Get-
DataSize
See Appendix A.3 for GetMaximumExponent.
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B.4.2 Generate Query
Client-Side Invocation
Collaboration-Query(index)
1 Q[c, c
√
K]
2 for i← 0 to c
3 do for j ← 0 to c√K
4 do if i ∗ n+ j = index
5 then Q[i, j]← Encrypt(1, d s−12c−i−1 e)
6 else Q[i, j]← Encrypt(0, d s−12c−i−1 e)
7 return Q
B.4.3 Process Query Against Database
Server-side Invocation
See Appendix A.2 for Chang-Perform-Retrieval and override
C-Hypercube, Two-Hypercube with the following.
C-Hypercube(Q[][], n,m, d, index)
1 Rs[numSplitsc−d−1
2 t← d s−1
2c−dim+1 e
3 if c− d = 2
4 then Rs ← Two-Hypercube(Q,n,m, d+ 1, index · ( c
√
K)d)
5 else for k ← 0 to c√K
6 do prevParts← N −Hypercube(Q,n, n2t, d+ 1, index · ( c√K)d)
7 currParts← C − Split(prevParts, nt)
8 Rs ← C − Filter(Rs, Q, currParts, nt+1, k, d)
9 return Rs
Two-Hypercube(Q[][], n,m, index)
1 Rs[numSplits]
2 for i← 0 to c√K
3 do σ ← Sigma(Q[0], ns+1, i, index)
4 parts← Split(σ, n s+12 )
5 Rs ← Filter(Rs, Q[1][i], partsn s+12 +1)
6 return Rs
B.4.4 Extract Result
Client-Side Invocation
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Collaboration-Extract-Result(Rs[2c−1])
1 Rl ← Rs
2 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
3 while length(Rc) > 0
4 do s← d s−1length(Rl)e+ 1
5 for i← 0 to length(Rc)
6 do Rc[i]← Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ 2], s) · n+Decrypt(Rl[i ∗ 2 + 1], s)
7 Rl ← Rc
8 Rc[length(Rl)/2]
9 return Decrypt(Rl[0])
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The minimal definition of a public key for an RSA-composite based cryptosystem.
A library of homomorphic cryptosystem implementations. Each cryptosys-
tem has a cryptosystem which encrypts and decrypts, a key generated that
genrates a private and public key pair for a give key size, and the private and
public keys.
C.1.1 Class Cryptosystem
Generic definition of a Cryptosystem. A cryptosystem traditionally consists
of key generation, the encyption, and the decryption algorithms, but the key
generation has been seperated in this implementation.
Declaration
public abstract class Cryptosystem
extends java.lang.Object
All known subclasses
PaillierCryptosystem (in C.1.15, page 111), NaccacheSternCryptosystem (in C.1.11,
page 106), GoldwasserMicaliCryptosystem (in C.1.6, page 100), DamgardJurikCryp-
tosystem (in C.1.2, page 94)
Constructor summary
Cryptosystem()
Method summary
decrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey, PrivateKey) Decrypts a ci-
phertext given a public key and a private key.
encrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey) Encrpyts a plaintext given a
public key.
random(BigInteger) Acquires a random integer value between 1
and max.
Constructors
• Cryptosystem
public Cryptosystem( )
Methods
• decrypt
public abstract java.math.BigInteger decrypt(
java.math.BigInteger c, PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
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– Description
Decrypts a ciphertext given a public key and a private key.
– Parameters
∗ c – ciphertext
∗ pub – the public key
∗ pri – the corresponding private key
– Returns – the plaintext
• encrypt
public abstract java.math.BigInteger encrypt(
java.math.BigInteger x, PublicKey pub )
– Description
Encrpyts a plaintext given a public key.
– Parameters
∗ x – plaintext message
∗ pub – the public key for the corresponding system
– Returns – the ciphertext
• random
protected java.math.BigInteger random( java.math.BigInteger
max )
– Description
Acquires a random integer value between 1 and max.
– Parameters
∗ max – the maximum value
– Returns – a random value between 1 and max
C.1.2 Class DamgardJurikCryptosystem
Damgard-Jurik Cryptosystem was introduced in 2003 in Jurik’s doctoral thesis.
The cryptosystem is an extension of Paillier’s Cryptosystem, introduced in 1999.
The computational assumption that the security of this cryptosystem relies on
is also Composite Residuosity Assumption.
Declaration
public class DamgardJurikCryptosystem
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierCryptosystem (in C.1.15, page 111)
Constructor summary
DamgardJurikCryptosystem()
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Method summary
decrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey, PrivateKey) Decrypts a ci-
phertext given a public key and a private key.
encrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey) Encrpyts a plaintext given a
public key.
getLofS(BigInteger, BigInteger, int) Basically retrieves the dis-
crete log of (n+1)∧x in base n∧s.
Constructors
• DamgardJurikCryptosystem
public DamgardJurikCryptosystem( )
Methods
• decrypt
public java.math.BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
– Description
Decrypts a ciphertext given a public key and a private key.
– Parameters
∗ c – ciphertext
∗ pub – the public key
∗ pri – the corresponding private key
– Returns – the plaintext
• encrypt
public java.math.BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
– Description
Encrpyts a plaintext given a public key.
– Parameters
∗ x – plaintext message
∗ pub – the public key for the corresponding system
– Returns – the ciphertext
• getLofS
public java.math.BigInteger getLofS( java.math.BigInteger a,
java.math.BigInteger n, int s )
– Description
Basically retrieves the discrete log of (n+1)∧x in base n∧s.
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– Parameters
∗ a – the number which we are looking for the discrete log of
∗ n – the RSA composite
∗ s – the block factor
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierCryptosystem (in C.1.15, page 111)
• public BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c, PublicKey pub,
PrivateKey pri )
• public BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x, PublicKey pub )
• protected BigInteger L( java.math.BigInteger u,
java.math.BigInteger n )
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in
C.1.1, page 93)
• public abstract BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
• public abstract BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
• protected BigInteger random( java.math.BigInteger max )
C.1.3 Class DamgardJurikKeyGen
A key generator should create a single private and public key pair. This corre-
sponds to the Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class DamgardJurikKeyGen
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierKeyGen (in C.1.16, page 113)
Constructor summary
DamgardJurikKeyGen() Creates a key generator.
Method summary
generateKey(int)
Constructors
• DamgardJurikKeyGen
public DamgardJurikKeyGen( )
– Description
Creates a key generator. Default s is 1.
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Methods
• generateKey
public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
– Description copied from KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
Generates a public key and private key pair.
– Parameters
∗ keySize – the number of bits in the key
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierKeyGen
(in C.1.16, page 113)
• public void generateKey( int keySize )
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10,
page 104)
• protected BigInteger createPandQ( int keySize )
• public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
• public PrivateKey getPrivateKey( )
• public PublicKey getPublicKey( )
• protected static final P
• protected pri
• protected pub
• protected static final Q
C.1.4 Class DamgardJurikPrivateKey
The definition of a private key to be used with a Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class DamgardJurikPrivateKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierPrivateKey (in C.1.17, page 114)
Constructor summary
DamgardJurikPrivateKey(BigInteger, BigInteger) The pri-
vate key for a Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
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Constructors
• DamgardJurikPrivateKey
public DamgardJurikPrivateKey( java.math.BigInteger p,
java.math.BigInteger q )
– Description
The private key for a Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ p – a prime
∗ q – a prime with equal length
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
– Description copied from PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
Retrieves an instance of the proper cryptosystem to work with this
key.
– Returns – an instance of the appropriate cryptosystem
Members inher-
ited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierPrivateKey (in C.1.17,
page 114)
• public Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public BigInteger getLambda( )
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in
C.1.19, page 116)
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public BigInteger getP( )
• public BigInteger getQ( )
C.1.5 Class DamgardJurikPublicKey
The definition of a public key to be used with a Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class DamgardJurikPublicKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierPublicKey (in C.1.18, page 115)
Constructor summary
DamgardJurikPublicKey(BigInteger, BigInteger, int) The
public key for a Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
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Method summary
getCryptosystem()
setExp(int) Sets the exponent.
Constructors
• DamgardJurikPublicKey
public DamgardJurikPublicKey( java.math.BigInteger n,
java.math.BigInteger y, int s )
– Description
The public key for a Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ n – an RSA composite
∗ y – a wisely chosen constant
∗ s – the block size
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• setExp
public void setExp( int exp )
– Description
Sets the exponent. Since the exponent can chang so that ecrypted
values can be encrypted repeated to produce the original plaintext
after several equal numbered decryptions, this is present here.
– Parameters
∗ exp – the exponent
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.cryptosystems.PaillierPublicKey (in C.1.18, page 115)
• public Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in
C.1.20, page 118)
• protected e
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public int getExp( )
• public BigInteger getN( )
• public BigInteger getY( )
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C.1.6 Class GoldwasserMicaliCryptosystem
The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem was presented in the paper known for in-
troducing the idea of probabilistic public-key encryption. The advantage of
public-key cryptosystems are that strings of bits can be encrypted bit-by-bit
without loss of semantic security.
Declaration
public class GoldwasserMicaliCryptosystem
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in C.1.1, page 93)
Constructor summary
GoldwasserMicaliCryptosystem()
Method summary
decrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey, PrivateKey) Decrypts a ci-
phertext given a public key and a private key.
encrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey) Encrpyts a plaintext given a
public key.
jacobi(BigInteger, BigInteger) The jacobi symbol, and exten-
sion of the legendre symbol.
Constructors
• GoldwasserMicaliCryptosystem
public GoldwasserMicaliCryptosystem( )
Methods
• decrypt
public java.math.BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
– Description
Decrypts a ciphertext given a public key and a private key.
– Parameters
∗ c – ciphertext
∗ pub – the public key
∗ pri – the corresponding private key
– Returns – the plaintext
• encrypt
public java.math.BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
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– Description
Encrpyts a plaintext given a public key.
– Parameters
∗ x – plaintext message
∗ pub – the public key for the corresponding system
– Returns – the ciphertext
• jacobi
public int jacobi( java.math.BigInteger a,
java.math.BigInteger n )
– Description
The jacobi symbol, and extension of the legendre symbol. ALgorithm
borrwoed from ”The Handbook of Applied Cryptography” algoritm
2.149.
– Parameters
∗ a – the ”numerator”
∗ n – the ”denominator”
– Returns – the jacobi symbol of a/n
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in
C.1.1, page 93)
• public abstract BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
• public abstract BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
• protected BigInteger random( java.math.BigInteger max )
C.1.7 Class GoldwasserMicaliKeyGen
A key generator should create a single private and public key pair. This corre-
sponds to the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class GoldwasserMicaliKeyGen
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
Constructor summary
GoldwasserMicaliKeyGen() Creates a key generator.
Method summary
generateKey(int)
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Constructors
• GoldwasserMicaliKeyGen
public GoldwasserMicaliKeyGen( )
– Description
Creates a key generator.
Methods
• generateKey
public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
– Description copied from KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
Generates a public key and private key pair.
– Parameters
∗ keySize – the number of bits in the key
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10,
page 104)
• protected BigInteger createPandQ( int keySize )
• public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
• public PrivateKey getPrivateKey( )
• public PublicKey getPublicKey( )
• protected static final P
• protected pri
• protected pub
• protected static final Q
C.1.8 Class GoldwasserMicaliPrivateKey
The definition of a private key to be used with a Goldwasser-Micali cryptosys-
tem.
Declaration
public class GoldwasserMicaliPrivateKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
Constructor summary
GoldwasserMicaliPrivateKey(BigInteger, BigInteger) The
private key for a Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
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Constructors
• GoldwasserMicaliPrivateKey
public GoldwasserMicaliPrivateKey( java.math.BigInteger p,
java.math.BigInteger q )
– Description
The private key for a Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ p – a prime
∗ q – a prime with equal length
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
– Description copied from PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
Retrieves an instance of the proper cryptosystem to work with this
key.
– Returns – an instance of the appropriate cryptosystem
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in
C.1.19, page 116)
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public BigInteger getP( )
• public BigInteger getQ( )
C.1.9 Class GoldwasserMicaliPublicKey
The definition of a public key to be used with a Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class GoldwasserMicaliPublicKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in C.1.20, page 118)
Constructor summary
GoldwasserMicaliPublicKey(BigInteger, BigInteger) The
public key for a Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
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Constructors
• GoldwasserMicaliPublicKey
public GoldwasserMicaliPublicKey( java.math.BigInteger n,
java.math.BigInteger y )
– Description
The public key for a Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ n – an RSA composite
∗ y – a wisely chosen constant
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in
C.1.20, page 118)
• protected e
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public int getExp( )
• public BigInteger getN( )
• public BigInteger getY( )
C.1.10 Class KeyGen
A key generator should create a single private and public key pair.
Declaration
public abstract class KeyGen
extends java.lang.Object
All known subclasses
PaillierKeyGen (in C.1.16, page 113), NaccacheSternKeyGen (in C.1.12, page 107),
GoldwasserMicaliKeyGen (in C.1.7, page 101), DamgardJurikKeyGen (in C.1.3, page
96)
Field summary
P
pri
pub
Q
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Constructor summary
KeyGen()
Method summary
createPandQ(int) Generates p and q of equal length such that the
length of p is keySize/2.
generateKey(int) Generates a public key and private key pair.
getPrivateKey() Returns the private key.
getPublicKey() Returns the public key.
Fields
• protected static final int P
• protected static final int Q
• protected PrivateKey pri
• protected PublicKey pub
Constructors
• KeyGen
public KeyGen( )
Methods
• createPandQ
protected java.math.BigInteger[] createPandQ( int keySize )
– Description
Generates p and q of equal length such that the length of p is key-
Size/2.
– Parameters
∗ keySize – the size of n given n=pq
– Returns – teo primes, p and q
• generateKey
public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
– Description
Generates a public key and private key pair.
– Parameters
∗ keySize – the number of bits in the key
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• getPrivateKey
public PrivateKey getPrivateKey( )
– Description
Returns the private key.
– Returns – private key
• getPublicKey
public PublicKey getPublicKey( )
– Description
Returns the public key.
– Returns – public key
C.1.11 Class NaccacheSternCryptosystem
Can be easily seen as an extension of Benaloh’s cryptosystem. The Naccache-
Stern cryptosystem came about in 1998 and is based on the Higher Residuosity
Assumption as opposed to the Prime Residuosity Assumpiton which the Benaloh
Cryptosystem relies on.
Declaration
public class NaccacheSternCryptosystem
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in C.1.1, page 93)
Constructor summary
NaccacheSternCryptosystem()
Method summary
decrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey, PrivateKey) Decrypts a ci-
phertext given a public key and a private key.
encrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey) Encrpyts a plaintext given a
public key.
Constructors
• NaccacheSternCryptosystem
public NaccacheSternCryptosystem( )
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Methods
• decrypt
public java.math.BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
– Description
Decrypts a ciphertext given a public key and a private key.
– Parameters
∗ c – ciphertext
∗ pub – the public key
∗ pri – the corresponding private key
– Returns – the plaintext
• encrypt
public java.math.BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
– Description
Encrpyts a plaintext given a public key.
– Parameters
∗ x – plaintext message
∗ pub – the public key for the corresponding system
– Returns – the ciphertext
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in
C.1.1, page 93)
• public abstract BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
• public abstract BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
• protected BigInteger random( java.math.BigInteger max )
C.1.12 Class NaccacheSternKeyGen
A key generator should create a single private and public key pair. This corre-
sponds to the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class NaccacheSternKeyGen
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
Field summary
DEFAULT K
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Constructor summary
NaccacheSternKeyGen() Generates public and private key pair
for a Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
Method summary
generateKey(int)
setNumPrimes(int) Sets the number of primes that comprises the
public key N.
Fields
• public static final int DEFAULT K
Constructors
• NaccacheSternKeyGen
public NaccacheSternKeyGen( )
– Description
Generates public and private key pair for a Naccache-Stern cryp-
tosystem.
Methods
• generateKey
public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
– Description copied from KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
Generates a public key and private key pair.
– Parameters
∗ keySize – the number of bits in the key
• setNumPrimes
public void setNumPrimes( int numPrimes )
– Description
Sets the number of primes that comprises the public key N.
– Parameters
∗ numPrimes – number of primes in N
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Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10,
page 104)
• protected BigInteger createPandQ( int keySize )
• public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
• public PrivateKey getPrivateKey( )
• public PublicKey getPublicKey( )
• protected static final P
• protected pri
• protected pub
• protected static final Q
C.1.13 Class NaccacheSternPrivateKey
The definition of a private key to be used with a Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class NaccacheSternPrivateKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
Constructor summary
NaccacheSternPrivateKey(BigInteger, BigInteger, BigInte-
ger, BigInteger[]) The private key for a Naccache-Stern cryp-
tosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
getPhi() Euler-phi function of n
getPs() A family of primes
Constructors
• NaccacheSternPrivateKey
public NaccacheSternPrivateKey( java.math.BigInteger p,
java.math.BigInteger q, java.math.BigInteger phi,
java.math.BigInteger[] ps )
– Description
The private key for a Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ p – a prime
∗ q – a prime with equal length
∗ phi – Euler-phi function of n
∗ ps – the family of primes
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Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
– Description copied from PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
Retrieves an instance of the proper cryptosystem to work with this
key.
– Returns – an instance of the appropriate cryptosystem
• getPhi
public java.math.BigInteger getPhi( )
– Description
Euler-phi function of n
– Returns – the number of relatively prime numbers below n
• getPs
public java.math.BigInteger[] getPs( )
– Description
A family of primes
– Returns – a family of primes
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in
C.1.19, page 116)
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public BigInteger getP( )
• public BigInteger getQ( )
C.1.14 Class NaccacheSternPublicKey
The definition of a public key to be used with a Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class NaccacheSternPublicKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in C.1.20, page 118)
Constructor summary
NaccacheSternPublicKey(BigInteger, BigInteger, BigInte-
ger) The public key for a Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
getSigma() The wisely chosen constant sigma
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Constructors
• NaccacheSternPublicKey
public NaccacheSternPublicKey( java.math.BigInteger n,
java.math.BigInteger y, java.math.BigInteger sig )
– Description
The public key for a Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ n – an RSA composite
∗ y – a wisely chosen constant
∗ sig – a wisely chosen constant
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• getSigma
public java.math.BigInteger getSigma( )
– Description
The wisely chosen constant sigma
– Returns – the wisely chosen constant sigma
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in
C.1.20, page 118)
• protected e
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public int getExp( )
• public BigInteger getN( )
• public BigInteger getY( )
C.1.15 Class PaillierCryptosystem
Paillier’s Cryptosystem came out around 1999, and relies upon the Composite
Residuosity Assumption.
Declaration
public class PaillierCryptosystem
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in C.1.1, page 93)
All known subclasses
DamgardJurikCryptosystem (in C.1.2, page 94)
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Constructor summary
PaillierCryptosystem()
Method summary
decrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey, PrivateKey) Decrypts a ci-
phertext given a public key and a private key.
encrypt(BigInteger, PublicKey) Encrpyts a plaintext given a
public key.
L(BigInteger, BigInteger) L(u) = (u-1)/n
Constructors
• PaillierCryptosystem
public PaillierCryptosystem( )
Methods
• decrypt
public java.math.BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
– Description
Decrypts a ciphertext given a public key and a private key.
– Parameters
∗ c – ciphertext
∗ pub – the public key
∗ pri – the corresponding private key
– Returns – the plaintext
• encrypt
public java.math.BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
– Description
Encrpyts a plaintext given a public key.
– Parameters
∗ x – plaintext message
∗ pub – the public key for the corresponding system
– Returns – the ciphertext
• L
protected java.math.BigInteger L( java.math.BigInteger u,
java.math.BigInteger n )
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– Description
L(u) = (u-1)/n
– Parameters
∗ u – the parameter of this function
∗ n – the cryptosystem modulus
– Returns – L(u) at n
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem (in
C.1.1, page 93)
• public abstract BigInteger decrypt( java.math.BigInteger c,
PublicKey pub, PrivateKey pri )
• public abstract BigInteger encrypt( java.math.BigInteger x,
PublicKey pub )
• protected BigInteger random( java.math.BigInteger max )
C.1.16 Class PaillierKeyGen
A key generator should create a single private and public key pair. This corre-
sponds to the Paillier cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class PaillierKeyGen
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
All known subclasses
DamgardJurikKeyGen (in C.1.3, page 96)
Constructor summary
PaillierKeyGen() Creates a key generator.
Method summary
generateKey(int)
Constructors
• PaillierKeyGen
public PaillierKeyGen( )
– Description
Creates a key generator.
114 APPENDIX C. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTATION
Methods
• generateKey
public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
– Description copied from KeyGen (in C.1.10, page 104)
Generates a public key and private key pair.
– Parameters
∗ keySize – the number of bits in the key
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen (in C.1.10,
page 104)
• protected BigInteger createPandQ( int keySize )
• public abstract void generateKey( int keySize )
• public PrivateKey getPrivateKey( )
• public PublicKey getPublicKey( )
• protected static final P
• protected pri
• protected pub
• protected static final Q
C.1.17 Class PaillierPrivateKey
The definition of a private key to be used with a Paillier cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class PaillierPrivateKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
All known subclasses
DamgardJurikPrivateKey (in C.1.4, page 97)
Constructor summary
PaillierPrivateKey(BigInteger, BigInteger) The private key
for a Paillier cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
getLambda() Returns lambda.
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Constructors
• PaillierPrivateKey
public PaillierPrivateKey( java.math.BigInteger p,
java.math.BigInteger q )
– Description
The private key for a Paillier cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ p – a prime
∗ q – a prime with equal length
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
– Description copied from PrivateKey (in C.1.19, page 116)
Retrieves an instance of the proper cryptosystem to work with this
key.
– Returns – an instance of the appropriate cryptosystem
• getLambda
public java.math.BigInteger getLambda( )
– Description
Returns lambda.
– Returns – lambda
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey (in
C.1.19, page 116)
• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• public BigInteger getP( )
• public BigInteger getQ( )
C.1.18 Class PaillierPublicKey
The definition of a public key to be used with a Paillier cryptosystem.
Declaration
public class PaillierPublicKey
extends edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in C.1.20, page 118)
All known subclasses
DamgardJurikPublicKey (in C.1.5, page 98)
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Constructor summary
PaillierPublicKey(BigInteger, BigInteger) The public key for
a Paillier cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
Constructors
• PaillierPublicKey
public PaillierPublicKey( java.math.BigInteger n,
java.math.BigInteger y )
– Description
The public key for a Paillier cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ n – an RSA composite
∗ y – a wisely chosen constant
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
Members inherited from class edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey (in
C.1.20, page 118)
• protected e• public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )• public int getExp( )• public BigInteger getN( )• public BigInteger getY( )
C.1.19 Class PrivateKey
The minimal definition of a private key for an RSA-composite based cryptosys-
tem.
Declaration
public abstract class PrivateKey
extends java.lang.Object
All known subclasses
PaillierPrivateKey (in C.1.17, page 114), NaccacheSternPrivateKey (in C.1.13, page
109), GoldwasserMicaliPrivateKey (in C.1.8, page 102), DamgardJurikPrivateKey (in
C.1.4, page 97)
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Constructor summary
PrivateKey(BigInteger, BigInteger) The private key for a
generic RSA-Composite based cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem() Retrieves an instance of the proper cryptosys-
tem to work with this key.
getP() The prime factor p.
getQ() The prime factor q.
Constructors
• PrivateKey
public PrivateKey( java.math.BigInteger p,
java.math.BigInteger q )
– Description
The private key for a generic RSA-Composite based cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ p – a prime
∗ q – a prime with equal length
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
– Description
Retrieves an instance of the proper cryptosystem to work with this
key.
– Returns – an instance of the appropriate cryptosystem
• getP
public java.math.BigInteger getP( )
– Description
The prime factor p.
– Returns – the prime factor p
• getQ
public java.math.BigInteger getQ( )
– Description
The prime factor q.
– Returns – the prime factor q
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C.1.20 Class PublicKey
The minimal definition of a public key for an RSA-composite based cryptosys-
tem.
Declaration
public abstract class PublicKey
extends java.lang.Object
All known subclasses
PaillierPublicKey (in C.1.18, page 115), NaccacheSternPublicKey (in C.1.14, page
110), GoldwasserMicaliPublicKey (in C.1.9, page 103), DamgardJurikPublicKey (in
C.1.5, page 98)
Field summary
e
Constructor summary
PublicKey(BigInteger, BigInteger, int) The public key for a
generic RSA-Composite based cryptosystem.
Method summary
getCryptosystem()
getExp() The exponent for the RSA composite.
getN() The RSA composite n.
getY() The specially chosen constant for easy backdoor computa-
tion.
Fields
• protected int e
Constructors
• PublicKey
public PublicKey( java.math.BigInteger n,
java.math.BigInteger y, int e )
– Description
The public key for a generic RSA-Composite based cryptosystem.
– Parameters
∗ n – an RSA composite
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∗ y – a wisely chosen constant
∗ e – the RSA composites exponent
Methods
• getCryptosystem
public abstract Cryptosystem getCryptosystem( )
• getExp
public int getExp( )
– Description
The exponent for the RSA composite.
– Returns – exponent
• getN
public java.math.BigInteger getN( )
– Description
The RSA composite n.
– Returns – the RSA composite
• getY
public java.math.BigInteger getY( )
– Description
The specially chosen constant for easy backdoor computation.
– Returns – the constant y
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C.2 Client-Side Library
Package Contents Page
Interfaces
IClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Client interface for local operations on a client.
Classes
ChangClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Implementation of client side operations for Chang protocol.
CollaborationClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Implementation of client side operations for Chang protocol.
ExtendedChangClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
The client side functionality of Chang extended for use with the Damgard-Jurik
cryptosystem to use the block size factor for larger data transfer in one execution
with a smaller key.
GeneralizedChangClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
The client side functionality of Chang generalized for use with the Damgard-Jurik
cryptosystem to use the block size factor for larger data transfer in one execution
with a smaller key, but with the ability to limit the number of splits.
HypercubeClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Implementation of the client-side query creation for all of the hypercube based
protocols.
LipmaaClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Implementation of client side operations for Lipmaa protocol.
PreSplitChangClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
SternClient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Implementation of client side operations for Stern protocol.
The local functions of a client in a Private Information Retrieval protocol.
C.2.1 Interface IClient
Client interface for local operations on a client. Q represents the type of the
query, SR represents the type of the server-side result to be extracted, and R is
the type of the result queried for.
Declaration
public interface IClient
All known subinterfaces
SternClient (in C.2.9, page 132), PreSplitChangClient (in C.2.8, page 131), Lipmaa-
Client (in C.2.7, page 130), HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127), GeneralizedChang-
C.2. CLIENT-SIDE LIBRARY 121
Client (in C.2.5, page 126), ExtendedChangClient (in C.2.4, page 124), Collabora-
tionClient (in C.2.3, page 123), ChangClient (in C.2.2, page 122)
All classes known to implement interface
SternClient (in C.2.9, page 132), HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127)
Field summary
KEY LENGTH BUFFER
Method summary
extractResult(SR) Extracts the result from the encrypted server-
side result.
generateQuery(int) Generates a query for a server to process.
getDomain() The domain for modular arithmetic to be performed
by a server while processing the private query.
Fields
• int KEY LENGTH BUFFER
Methods
• extractResult
R extractResult( SR serverResult )
– Description
Extracts the result from the encrypted server-side result.
– Parameters
∗ serverResult – the server-side result
– Returns – the desired result of the private query
• generateQuery
Q generateQuery( int index )
– Description
Generates a query for a server to process.
– Parameters
∗ index – the index of the element to be retrieved
– Returns – a private query
• getDomain
java.math.BigInteger getDomain( )
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– Description
The domain for modular arithmetic to be performed by a server while
processing the private query. The ciphertext domain.
– Returns – modulus for modular arithmetic
C.2.2 Class ChangClient
Implementation of client side operations for Chang protocol.
Declaration
public class ChangClient
extends edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127)
All known subclasses
PreSplitChangClient (in C.2.8, page 131)
Constructor summary
ChangClient(int, int, int, int, Cryptosystem, KeyGen) Cre-
ates a client to interact with a ChangServer.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger[])
Constructors
• ChangClient
public ChangClient( int dbSize, int dataSize, int numDim,
int dimLength, edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer. All parameters ex-
cept cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Paillier
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
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Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger[] serverResult )
Members in-
herited from class edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in
C.2.6, page 127)
• protected cry
• protected dataSize
• protected dbSize
• protected decreasing
• protected dimLength
• protected gen
• public BigInteger generateQuery( int index )
• public BigInteger getDomain( )
• protected increasing
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• protected pri
• protected pub
C.2.3 Class CollaborationClient
Implementation of client side operations for Chang protocol.
Declaration
public class CollaborationClient
extends edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127)
Constructor summary
CollaborationClient(int, int, int, int, int, Cryptosystem,
KeyGen) Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger[])
Constructors
• CollaborationClient
public CollaborationClient( int dbSize, int dataSize, int
numDim, int dimLength, int maxExp,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
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– Description
Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer. All parameters ex-
cept cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Paillier
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger[] serverResult )
Members in-
herited from class edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in
C.2.6, page 127)
• protected cry
• protected dataSize
• protected dbSize
• protected decreasing
• protected dimLength
• protected gen
• public BigInteger generateQuery( int index )
• public BigInteger getDomain( )
• protected increasing
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• protected pri
• protected pub
C.2.4 Class ExtendedChangClient
The client side functionality of Chang extended for use with the Damgard-Jurik
cryptosystem to use the block size factor for larger data transfer in one execution
with a smaller key.
Declaration
public class ExtendedChangClient
extends edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127)
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Constructor summary
ExtendedChangClient(int, int, int, int, int, Cryptosystem,
KeyGen) Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger[])
Constructors
• ExtendedChangClient
public ExtendedChangClient( int dbSize, int dataSize, int
numDim, int dimLength, int maxExp,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer. All parameters ex-
cept cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ maxExp – the exponent for the cryptosystem, s
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Damgard-
Jurik
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger[] serverResult )
Members in-
herited from class edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in
C.2.6, page 127)
• protected cry
• protected dataSize
• protected dbSize
• protected decreasing
• protected dimLength
• protected gen
• public BigInteger generateQuery( int index )
• public BigInteger getDomain( )
• protected increasing
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• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• protected pri
• protected pub
C.2.5 Class GeneralizedChangClient
The client side functionality of Chang generalized for use with the Damgard-
Jurik cryptosystem to use the block size factor for larger data transfer in one
execution with a smaller key, but with the ability to limit the number of splits.
Declaration
public class GeneralizedChangClient
extends edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127)
Constructor summary
GeneralizedChangClient(int, int, int, int, int, int, Cryp-
tosystem, KeyGen) Creates a client to interact with a
ChangServer.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger[])
Constructors
• GeneralizedChangClient
public GeneralizedChangClient( int dbSize, int dataSize,
int numDim, int dimLength, int numSplits, int maxExp,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer. All parameters ex-
cept cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ numSplits – the number of splits, so that the ciphertext can be
in the domain of the plaintext
∗ maxExp – the exponent for the cryptosystem, s
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∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Damgard-
Jurik
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger[] serverResult )
Members in-
herited from class edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in
C.2.6, page 127)
• protected cry
• protected dataSize
• protected dbSize
• protected decreasing
• protected dimLength
• protected gen
• public BigInteger generateQuery( int index )
• public BigInteger getDomain( )
• protected increasing
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• protected pri
• protected pub
C.2.6 Class HypercubeClient
Implementation of the client-side query creation for all of the hypercube based
protocols. In general design practice, this class would probably not encompass
the Lipmaa protocol as well, because of the varying plaintext.
Declaration
public abstract class HypercubeClient
extends java.lang.Object
implements IClient
All known subclasses
PreSplitChangClient (in C.2.8, page 131), LipmaaClient (in C.2.7, page 130), Gen-
eralizedChangClient (in C.2.5, page 126), ExtendedChangClient (in C.2.4, page 124),
CollaborationClient (in C.2.3, page 123), ChangClient (in C.2.2, page 122)
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Field summary
cry
dataSize
dbSize
decreasing
dimLength
gen
increasing
maxExp
numDim
numSplits
pri
pub
Constructor summary
HypercubeClient(int, int, int, int, int, int, boolean,
boolean, Cryptosystem, KeyGen) Creates a client to in-
teract with a server that retrieves data from the database in a
hypercube fashion.
Method summary
generateQuery(int)
getDomain()
Fields
• protected int dbSize
• protected int dataSize
• protected int numDim
• protected int dimLength
• protected int maxExp
• protected int numSplits
• protected edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry
• protected edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen
• protected edu.rit.cryptosystems.PublicKey pub
• protected edu.rit.cryptosystems.PrivateKey pri
• protected boolean increasing
• protected boolean decreasing
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Constructors
• HypercubeClient
public HypercubeClient( int dbSize, int dataSize, int
numDim, int dimLength, int numSplits, int maxExp,
boolean increasing, boolean decreasing,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a server that retrieves data from the
database in a hypercube fashion. All parameters except cry and gen
should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ numSplits – the number of splits, so that the ciphertext can be
in the domain of the plaintext
∗ maxExp – the exponent for the cryptosystem, s
∗ increasing – basically for the Lipmaa server
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Damgard-
Jurik
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
Methods
• generateQuery
Q generateQuery( int index )
– Description copied from IClient (in C.2.1, page 120)
Generates a query for a server to process.
– Parameters
∗ index – the index of the element to be retrieved
– Returns – a private query
• getDomain
java.math.BigInteger getDomain( )
– Description copied from IClient (in C.2.1, page 120)
The domain for modular arithmetic to be performed by a server while
processing the private query. The ciphertext domain.
– Returns – modulus for modular arithmetic
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C.2.7 Class LipmaaClient
Implementation of client side operations for Lipmaa protocol.
Declaration
public class LipmaaClient
extends edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in C.2.6, page 127)
Constructor summary
LipmaaClient(int, int, int, int, int, Cryptosystem, KeyGen)
Creates a client to interact with a Lipmaa Server.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger)
Constructors
• LipmaaClient
public LipmaaClient( int dbSize, int dataSize, int
numDim, int dimLength, int maxExp,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a Lipmaa Server. All parameters
except cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ maxExp – the exponent for the cryptosystem, s
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Damgard-
Jurik
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger serverResult )
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Members in-
herited from class edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in
C.2.6, page 127)
• protected cry• protected dataSize• protected dbSize• protected decreasing• protected dimLength• protected gen• public BigInteger generateQuery( int index )• public BigInteger getDomain( )• protected increasing• protected maxExp• protected numDim• protected numSplits• protected pri• protected pub
C.2.8 Class PreSplitChangClient
Declaration
public class PreSplitChangClient
extends edu.rit.local.simple.client.ChangClient (in C.2.2, page 122)
Constructor summary
PreSplitChangClient(int, int, int, int, Cryptosystem, Key-
Gen) Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger[])
Constructors
• PreSplitChangClient
public PreSplitChangClient( int dbSize, int dataSize, int
numDim, int dimLength, edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem
cry, edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a ChangServer. All parameters ex-
cept cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions
∗ dimLength – the length of a dimension
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client, Paillier
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
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Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger[] serverResult )
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.client.ChangClient (in C.2.2, page 122)
• public BigInteger extractResult( java.math.BigInteger[]
serverResult )
Members in-
herited from class edu.rit.local.simple.client.HypercubeClient (in
C.2.6, page 127)
• protected cry
• protected dataSize
• protected dbSize
• protected decreasing
• protected dimLength
• protected gen
• public BigInteger generateQuery( int index )
• public BigInteger getDomain( )
• protected increasing
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• protected pri
• protected pub
C.2.9 Class SternClient
Implementation of client side operations for Stern protocol.
Declaration
public class SternClient
extends java.lang.Object
implements IClient
Constructor summary
SternClient(int, int, Cryptosystem, KeyGen) Creates a client
to interact with a Stern Server.
Method summary
extractResult(BigInteger)
generateQuery(int)
getDomain()
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Constructors
• SternClient
public SternClient( int dbSize, int dataSize,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.Cryptosystem cry,
edu.rit.cryptosystems.KeyGen gen )
– Description
Creates a client to interact with a Stern Server. All parameters except
cry and gen should be retrieved from the server object.
– Parameters
∗ dbSize – number of records in the database
∗ dataSize – the size of each record in the database
∗ cry – the cryptosystem to be used with this client
∗ gen – the key generated to create keys for the cryptosystem
Methods
• extractResult
public java.math.BigInteger extractResult(
java.math.BigInteger serverResult )
• generateQuery
Q generateQuery( int index )
– Description copied from IClient (in C.2.1, page 120)
Generates a query for a server to process.
– Parameters
∗ index – the index of the element to be retrieved
– Returns – a private query
• getDomain
java.math.BigInteger getDomain( )
– Description copied from IClient (in C.2.1, page 120)
The domain for modular arithmetic to be performed by a server while
processing the private query. The ciphertext domain.
– Returns – modulus for modular arithmetic
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Package Contents Page
Interfaces
IServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
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Interface for a simple server, the local functions.
Classes
BigIntegerServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Provides all of the database functionality for those servers using a BigInteger[] as
the database.
ChangServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality 9
in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol.
ChangServer.NHypercubeThread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Thread helper to execute recusive nHypercube calls as seperate threads.
CollaborationServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol.
ExtendedChangServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol, but extended in the
sense that the cryptosystem used in Damgard-Jurik’s extension to Paillier’s cryp-
tosystem, and thus rather than considering maximum exponent as 1 as in Paillier’s,
the maximum exponent can now be greater than 1.
GeneralizedChangServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol, but extended in the
sense that the cryptosystem used in Damgard-Jurik’s extension to Paillier’s cryp-
tosystem, and thus rather than considering maximum exponent as 1 as in Paillier’s,
the maximum exponent can now be greater than 1.
LipmaaServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Lipmaa Private Information Retrieval protocol.
PreSplitChangServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
SternServer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Stern Private Information Retrieval protocol.
The local functions of a server in a Private Information Retrieval protocol.
C.3.1 Interface IServer
Interface for a simple server, the local functions. D represents the database
type, Q represents the query type, and R represents the result type. But D, Q
and R should only be BigInteger, BigInteger[], or BigInteger[][].
Declaration
public interface IServer
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All known subinterfaces
SternServer (in C.3.10, page 157), PreSplitChangServer (in C.3.9, page 154), Lip-
maaServer (in C.3.8, page 153), GeneralizedChangServer (in C.3.7, page 150), Ex-
tendedChangServer (in C.3.6, page 148), CollaborationServer (in C.3.5, page 145),
ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139), BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
All classes known to implement interface
BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
Method summary
getDatabaseDimensions() The number of dimensions this
database is referenced by.
getDatabaseSize() The size of the database.
getDataSize() The size of the data in bytes.
getDimensionLength() The length of a dimension.
getMaxExponent() The maximum exponent, s, used in the
Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
getNumberOfSplits() The number of splits, necessary for the
Chang protocol.
performRetrieval(Q, BigInteger) Public function for performing
the retrieval.
setDatabase(D) Sets the database for this server.
Methods
• getDatabaseDimensions
int getDatabaseDimensions( )
– Description
The number of dimensions this database is referenced by.
– Returns – number of dimensions for referencing an item in this
database
• getDatabaseSize
int getDatabaseSize( )
– Description
The size of the database. The number of entries in the database.
– Returns – size of the database
• getDataSize
int getDataSize( )
– Description
The size of the data in bytes.
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– Returns – size of data
• getDimensionLength
int getDimensionLength( )
– Description
The length of a dimension.
– Returns – number of records in a dimension
• getMaxExponent
int getMaxExponent( )
– Description
The maximum exponent, s, used in the Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
– Returns – maximum exponent, s, used
• getNumberOfSplits
int getNumberOfSplits( )
– Description
The number of splits, necessary for the Chang protocol.
– Returns – the number of splits per dimension
• performRetrieval
R performRetrieval( Q query, java.math.BigInteger domain )
– Description
Public function for performing the retrieval.
– Parameters
∗ query – user query
∗ domain – BigInteger for modular arithmetic
– Returns – the result of the retrieval, encrypted
• setDatabase
void setDatabase( D db )
– Description
Sets the database for this server.
– Parameters
∗ db – the database
C.3.2 Class BigIntegerServer
Provides all of the database functionality for those servers using a BigInteger[] as
the database. Extending classes will then only need to implement the protocol
for private information retrieval.
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Declaration
public abstract class BigIntegerServer
extends java.lang.Object
implements IServer
All known subclasses
SternServer (in C.3.10, page 157), PreSplitChangServer (in C.3.9, page 154), Lip-
maaServer (in C.3.8, page 153), GeneralizedChangServer (in C.3.7, page 150), Ex-
tendedChangServer (in C.3.6, page 148), CollaborationServer (in C.3.5, page 145),
ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Field summary
dataSize
db
dbSize
dimLength
maxExp
numDim
numSplits
Constructor summary
BigIntegerServer(int, int, int) Creates a server object that con-
tains the methods required for the server in homomorphic en-
cryption based private information retrieval scheme.
Method summary
getDatabaseDimensions()
getDatabaseSize()
getDataSize()
getDimensionLength()
getMaxExponent()
getNumberOfSplits()
setDatabase(BigInteger[])
Fields
• protected java.math.BigInteger db
• protected int dbSize
• protected int dataSize
• protected int numDim
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• protected int dimLength
• protected int numSplits
• protected int maxExp
Constructors
• BigIntegerServer
public BigIntegerServer( int numDim, int maxExp, int
numSplits )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a GeneralizedChangClient.
– Parameters
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
∗ numSplits – the number of splits per dimension of the hypercube
∗ maxExp – the maximum exponent, s, to be used in a Lipmaa
Public Key
Methods
• getDatabaseDimensions
int getDatabaseDimensions( )
– Description copied from IServer (in C.3.1, page 134)
The number of dimensions this database is referenced by.
– Returns – number of dimensions for referencing an item in this
database
• getDatabaseSize
int getDatabaseSize( )
– Description copied from IServer (in C.3.1, page 134)
The size of the database. The number of entries in the database.
– Returns – size of the database
• getDataSize
int getDataSize( )
– Description copied from IServer (in C.3.1, page 134)
The size of the data in bytes.
– Returns – size of data
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• getDimensionLength
int getDimensionLength( )
– Description copied from IServer (in C.3.1, page 134)
The length of a dimension.
– Returns – number of records in a dimension
• getMaxExponent
int getMaxExponent( )
– Description copied from IServer (in C.3.1, page 134)
The maximum exponent, s, used in the Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem.
– Returns – maximum exponent, s, used
• getNumberOfSplits
int getNumberOfSplits( )
– Description copied from IServer (in C.3.1, page 134)
The number of splits, necessary for the Chang protocol.
– Returns – the number of splits per dimension
• setDatabase
public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.3 Class ChangServer
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol.
Declaration
public class ChangServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
All known subclasses
PreSplitChangServer (in C.3.9, page 154), GeneralizedChangServer (in C.3.7, page
150), ExtendedChangServer (in C.3.6, page 148), CollaborationServer (in C.3.5, page
145)
Constructor summary
ChangServer(int) Creates a server object that contains the meth-
ods required for the server in homomorphic encryption based
private information retrieval scheme.
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Method summary
filter(BigInteger[], BigInteger, BigInteger[], BigInteger) Fil-
ters the split from the two-dimensional hypercube method.
getResultLength(int) Determines the length for a result, at a
given dimension
nFilter(BigInteger[], BigInteger[][], BigInteger[], BigInte-
ger, int, int) Filters the recent split split from an nHypercube
call split
nHypercube(BigInteger[][], BigInteger, BigInteger, int, int)
A recursive method that performs the private retrieval of a query
on the databse.
nSplit(BigInteger[], BigInteger) Splits the split from the previ-
ous split.
performRetrieval(BigInteger[][], BigInteger)
sigma(BigInteger[], BigInteger, int, int) Computes sigma using
only the top two dimension of the database
split(BigInteger, BigInteger) Splits a sigma in the two-
dimensional hypercube method.
twoHypercube(BigInteger[][], BigInteger, BigInteger, int)
The base case of the nHypercube method.
Constructors
• ChangServer
public ChangServer( int numDim )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a ChangClient.
– Parameters
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
Methods
• filter
protected java.math.BigInteger[] filter(
java.math.BigInteger[] result, java.math.BigInteger query,
java.math.BigInteger[] split, java.math.BigInteger modulus )
– Description
Filters the split from the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
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∗ result – the result thus far, for further manipulation
∗ query – the query presented by the client, that particular one
∗ split – the current split operating with
∗ modulus – the cipher text domain
– Returns – the filtered result, through the current sigma
• getResultLength
protected int getResultLength( int dim )
– Description
Determines the length for a result, at a given dimension
– Parameters
∗ dim – the current dimension this is to be computed for
– Returns – the length of a result
• nFilter
protected java.math.BigInteger[] nFilter(
java.math.BigInteger[] result, java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger[] split, java.math.BigInteger
modulus, int k, int dim )
– Description
Filters the recent split split from an nHypercube call split
– Parameters
∗ result – the result being manipulated further
∗ query – the client issued query
∗ split – the split to be filtered
∗ modulus – the ciphertext domain
∗ k – the current in dex in the current dimension of the query
∗ dim – the current dimension being considered
– Returns – the recent manipulation of the filtered result
• nHypercube
protected java.math.BigInteger[] nHypercube(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger
domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int dim, int index )
– Description
A recursive method that performs the private retrieval of a query on
the databse.
– Parameters
∗ query – the client generated query
∗ domain – the public key RSA composite from the client
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∗ n2 – the domain of the ciphertext
∗ dim – the current dimension we are on - should call with 0
∗ index – the index thus far - should call with 0
– Returns – the filtered result of the current dimension
• nSplit
protected java.math.BigInteger[] nSplit(
java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit, java.math.BigInteger
domain )
– Description
Splits the split from the previous split.
– Parameters
∗ prevSplit – previous split from the last recursive nHypercube
call
∗ domain – the plaintext domain, RSA composite of the public key
– Returns – the new split
• performRetrieval
public java.math.BigInteger[] performRetrieval(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger domain
)
• sigma
protected java.math.BigInteger sigma( java.math.BigInteger[]
query, java.math.BigInteger modulus, int dim, int index )
– Description
Computes sigma using only the top two dimension of the database
– Parameters
∗ query – the client generated query, top dimension
∗ modulus – the ciphertext domain
∗ dim – the index of the second level dimension
∗ index – the index thus far minus the first and second dimensions
– Returns – sigma for that particular second dimension
• split
protected java.math.BigInteger[] split( java.math.BigInteger
sigma, java.math.BigInteger domain )
– Description
Splits a sigma in the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ sigma – the sigma to split
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∗ domain – the RSA composite of the client’s public-key
– Returns – the results of the split
• twoHypercube
protected java.math.BigInteger[] twoHypercube(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger
domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int index )
– Description
The base case of the nHypercube method. Actually references the
database.
– Parameters
∗ query – the client generated query
∗ domain – the public key RSA composite from the client
∗ n2 – the domain of the ciphertext
∗ index – the index thus far
– Returns – the filtered result of the top two dimensions
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.4 Class ChangServer.NHypercubeThread
Thread helper to execute recusive nHypercube calls as seperate threads.
Declaration
protected class ChangServer.NHypercubeThread
extends java.lang.Thread
Constructor summary
ChangServer.NHypercubeThread(BigInteger[][], BigInte-
ger, BigInteger, int, int) Constructor that compies the pa-
rameters into this thread space.
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Method summary
getResult() Retrieves the result, or null if no result has been com-
puted.
run() Overriden.
Constructors
• ChangServer.NHypercubeThread
public ChangServer.NHypercubeThread(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger do-
main, java.math.BigInteger modulus, int dim, int index )
– Description
Constructor that compies the parameters into this thread space.
– Parameters
∗ query – client made query
∗ domain – plaintext doamin
∗ modulus – cipher text domain
∗ dim – current dimension of operation
∗ index – the index thus far from previous dimensions traversed
Methods
• getResult
public java.math.BigInteger[] getResult( )
– Description
Retrieves the result, or null if no result has been computed.
– Returns – the result of the recursive call
• run
public void run( )
– Description
Overriden. Executes the recusive call and stores the result in the
thread space for later retrieval.
Members inherited from class java.lang.Thread
• public static int activeCount( )
• public final void checkAccess( )
• public native int countStackFrames( )
• public static native Thread currentThread( )
• public void destroy( )
• public static void dumpStack( )
• public static int enumerate( Thread[] arg0 )
• public static Map getAllStackTraces( )
• public ClassLoader getContextClassLoader( )
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• public static Thread.UncaughtExceptionHandler
getDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler( )
• public long getId( )
• public final String getName( )
• public final int getPriority( )
• public StackTraceElement getStackTrace( )
• public Thread.State getState( )
• public final ThreadGroup getThreadGroup( )
• public Thread.UncaughtExceptionHandler
getUncaughtExceptionHandler( )
• public static native boolean holdsLock( Object arg0 )
• public void interrupt( )
• public static boolean interrupted( )
• public final native boolean isAlive( )
• public final boolean isDaemon( )
• public boolean isInterrupted( )
• public final void join( ) throws InterruptedException
• public final synchronized void join( long arg0 ) throws
InterruptedException
• public final synchronized void join( long arg0, int arg1 ) throws
InterruptedException
• public static final MAX PRIORITY
• public static final MIN PRIORITY
• public static final NORM PRIORITY
• public final void resume( )
• public void run( )
• public void setContextClassLoader( ClassLoader arg0 )
• public final void setDaemon( boolean arg0 )
• public static void setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler(
Thread.UncaughtExceptionHandler arg0 )
• public final void setName( String arg0 )
• public final void setPriority( int arg0 )
• public void setUncaughtExceptionHandler(
Thread.UncaughtExceptionHandler arg0 )
• public static native void sleep( long arg0 ) throws
InterruptedException
• public static void sleep( long arg0, int arg1 ) throws
InterruptedException
• public synchronized void start( )
• public final void stop( )
• public final synchronized void stop( Throwable arg0 )
• public final void suspend( )
• public String toString( )
• public static native void yield( )
C.3.5 Class CollaborationServer
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol.
Declaration
public class CollaborationServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
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Constructor summary
CollaborationServer(int, int) Creates a server object that con-
tains the methods required for the server in homomorphic en-
cryption based private information retrieval scheme.
Method summary
nHypercube(BigInteger[][], BigInteger, BigInteger, int, int)
A recursive method that performs the private retrieval of a query
on the databse.
performRetrieval(BigInteger[][], BigInteger)
twoHypercube(BigInteger[][], BigInteger, BigInteger, int)
The base case of the nHypercube method.
Constructors
• CollaborationServer
public CollaborationServer( int numDim, int maxExp )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a ChangClient.
– Parameters
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
Methods
• nHypercube
protected java.math.BigInteger[] nHypercube(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger
domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int dim, int index )
– Description
A recursive method that performs the private retrieval of a query on
the databse.
– Parameters
∗ query – the client generated query
∗ domain – the public key RSA composite from the client
∗ n2 – the domain of the ciphertext
∗ dim – the current dimension we are on - should call with 0
∗ index – the index thus far - should call with 0
– Returns – the filtered result of the current dimension
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• performRetrieval
public java.math.BigInteger[] performRetrieval(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger domain
)
• twoHypercube
protected java.math.BigInteger[] twoHypercube(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger
domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int index )
– Description
The base case of the nHypercube method. Actually references the
database.
– Parameters
∗ query – the client generated query
∗ domain – the public key RSA composite from the client
∗ n2 – the domain of the ciphertext
∗ index – the index thus far
– Returns – the filtered result of the top two dimensions
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
• protected BigInteger filter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus )
• protected int getResultLength( int dim )
• protected BigInteger nFilter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int k, int dim )
• protected BigInteger nHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][] query,
java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int dim,
int index )
• protected BigInteger nSplit( java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• public BigInteger performRetrieval( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger sigma( java.math.BigInteger[] query,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int dim, int index )
• protected BigInteger split( java.math.BigInteger sigma,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger twoHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int
index )
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
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• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.6 Class ExtendedChangServer
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol, but extended in
the sense that the cryptosystem used in Damgard-Jurik’s extension to Paillier’s
cryptosystem, and thus rather than considering maximum exponent as 1 as in
Paillier’s, the maximum exponent can now be greater than 1. and the number
of splits increases equally with the size of the maximum exponent.
Declaration
public class ExtendedChangServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Constructor summary
ExtendedChangServer(int, int) Creates a server object that
contains the methods required for the server in homomorphic
encryption based private information retrieval scheme.
Method summary
filter(BigInteger[], BigInteger, BigInteger[], BigInteger)
nSplit(BigInteger[], BigInteger)
split(BigInteger, BigInteger)
Constructors
• ExtendedChangServer
public ExtendedChangServer( int numDim, int maxExp )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a ExtendedhangClient.
– Parameters
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∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
∗ maxExp – the maximum exponent, s, to be used in a Damgard-
Jurik Public Key
Methods
• filter
protected java.math.BigInteger[] filter(
java.math.BigInteger[] result, java.math.BigInteger query,
java.math.BigInteger[] split, java.math.BigInteger modulus )
– Description copied from ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Filters the split from the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ result – the result thus far, for further manipulation
∗ query – the query presented by the client, that particular one
∗ split – the current split operating with
∗ modulus – the cipher text domain
– Returns – the filtered result, through the current sigma
• nSplit
protected java.math.BigInteger[] nSplit(
java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit, java.math.BigInteger
domain )
– Description copied from ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Splits the split from the previous split.
– Parameters
∗ prevSplit – previous split from the last recursive nHypercube
call
∗ domain – the plaintext domain, RSA composite of the public key
– Returns – the new split
• split
protected java.math.BigInteger[] split( java.math.BigInteger
sigma, java.math.BigInteger domain )
– Description copied from ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Splits a sigma in the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ sigma – the sigma to split
∗ domain – the RSA composite of the client’s public-key
– Returns – the results of the split
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Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
• protected BigInteger filter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus )
• protected int getResultLength( int dim )
• protected BigInteger nFilter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int k, int dim )
• protected BigInteger nHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][] query,
java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int dim,
int index )
• protected BigInteger nSplit( java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• public BigInteger performRetrieval( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger sigma( java.math.BigInteger[] query,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int dim, int index )
• protected BigInteger split( java.math.BigInteger sigma,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger twoHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int
index )
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.7 Class GeneralizedChangServer
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Chang Private Information Retrieval protocol, but extended in
the sense that the cryptosystem used in Damgard-Jurik’s extension to Paillier’s
cryptosystem, and thus rather than considering maximum exponent as 1 as in
Paillier’s, the maximum exponent can now be greater than 1. and the number
of splits is at most one less than the size of the exponent, and is user prescribed.
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Declaration
public class GeneralizedChangServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Constructor summary
GeneralizedChangServer(int, int, int) Creates a server object
that contains the methods required for the server in homomor-
phic encryption based private information retrieval scheme.
Method summary
filter(BigInteger[], BigInteger, BigInteger[], BigInteger)
nSplit(BigInteger[], BigInteger)
split(BigInteger, BigInteger)
Constructors
• GeneralizedChangServer
public GeneralizedChangServer( int numDim, int
numSplits, int maxExp )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a GeneralizedChangClient.
– Parameters
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
∗ numSplits – the number of splits per dimension of the hypercube
∗ maxExp – the maximum exponent, s, to be used in a Damgard-
Jurik Public Key
Methods
• filter
protected java.math.BigInteger[] filter(
java.math.BigInteger[] result, java.math.BigInteger query,
java.math.BigInteger[] split, java.math.BigInteger modulus )
– Description copied from ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Filters the split from the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ result – the result thus far, for further manipulation
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∗ query – the query presented by the client, that particular one
∗ split – the current split operating with
∗ modulus – the cipher text domain
– Returns – the filtered result, through the current sigma
• nSplit
protected java.math.BigInteger[] nSplit(
java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit, java.math.BigInteger
domain )
– Description copied from ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Splits the split from the previous split.
– Parameters
∗ prevSplit – previous split from the last recursive nHypercube
call
∗ domain – the plaintext domain, RSA composite of the public key
– Returns – the new split
• split
protected java.math.BigInteger[] split( java.math.BigInteger
sigma, java.math.BigInteger domain )
– Description copied from ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Splits a sigma in the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ sigma – the sigma to split
∗ domain – the RSA composite of the client’s public-key
– Returns – the results of the split
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
• protected BigInteger filter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus )
• protected int getResultLength( int dim )
• protected BigInteger nFilter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int k, int dim )
• protected BigInteger nHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][] query,
java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int dim,
int index )
• protected BigInteger nSplit( java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• public BigInteger performRetrieval( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain )
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• protected BigInteger sigma( java.math.BigInteger[] query,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int dim, int index )
• protected BigInteger split( java.math.BigInteger sigma,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger twoHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int
index )
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.8 Class LipmaaServer
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Lipmaa Private Information Retrieval protocol.
Declaration
public class LipmaaServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
Constructor summary
LipmaaServer(int, int) Creates a server object that contains
the methods required for the server in homomorphic encryption
based private information retrieval scheme.
Method summary
performRetrieval(BigInteger[][], BigInteger)
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Constructors
• LipmaaServer
public LipmaaServer( int numDim, int maxExp )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a LipmaaClient.
– Parameters
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
∗ maxExp – the maximum exponent, s, to be used in a Damgard-
Jurik Public Key
Methods
• performRetrieval
public java.math.BigInteger performRetrieval(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger domain
)
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.9 Class PreSplitChangServer
Declaration
public class PreSplitChangServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
Constructor summary
PreSplitChangServer(int) Creates a server object that contains
the methods required for the server in homomorphic encryption
based private information retrieval scheme.
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Method summary
filter(BigInteger[], BigInteger, BigInteger[], BigInteger) Fil-
ters the split from the two-dimensional hypercube method.
getResultLength(int) Determines the length for a result, at a
given dimension
split(BigInteger[], BigInteger) Splits a sigma in the two-
dimensional hypercube method.
twoHypercube(BigInteger[][], BigInteger, BigInteger, int)
The base case of the nHypercube method.
Constructors
• PreSplitChangServer
public PreSplitChangServer( int numDim )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a ChangClient.
– Parameters
∗ numDim – the number of dimensions to reference to reference the
database by
Methods
• filter
protected java.math.BigInteger[] filter(
java.math.BigInteger[] result, java.math.BigInteger query,
java.math.BigInteger[] split, java.math.BigInteger modulus )
– Description
Filters the split from the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ result – the result thus far, for further manipulation
∗ query – the query presented by the client, that particular one
∗ split – the current split operating with
∗ modulus – the cipher text domain
– Returns – the filtered result, through the current sigma
• getResultLength
protected int getResultLength( int dim )
– Description
Determines the length for a result, at a given dimension
156 APPENDIX C. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTATION
– Parameters
∗ dim – the current dimension this is to be computed for
– Returns – the length of a result
• split
protected java.math.BigInteger[] split(
java.math.BigInteger[] sigma, java.math.BigInteger domain )
– Description
Splits a sigma in the two-dimensional hypercube method.
– Parameters
∗ sigma – the sigma to split
∗ domain – the RSA composite of the client’s public-key
– Returns – the results of the split
• twoHypercube
protected java.math.BigInteger[] twoHypercube(
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger
domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int index )
– Description
The base case of the nHypercube method. Actually references the
database.
– Parameters
∗ query – the client generated query
∗ domain – the public key RSA composite from the client
∗ n2 – the domain of the ciphertext
∗ index – the index thus far
– Returns – the filtered result of the top two dimensions
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.ChangServer (in C.3.3, page 139)
• protected BigInteger filter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus )
• protected int getResultLength( int dim )
• protected BigInteger nFilter( java.math.BigInteger[] result,
java.math.BigInteger[][] query, java.math.BigInteger[] split,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int k, int dim )
• protected BigInteger nHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][] query,
java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int dim,
int index )
• protected BigInteger nSplit( java.math.BigInteger[] prevSplit,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
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• public BigInteger performRetrieval( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger sigma( java.math.BigInteger[] query,
java.math.BigInteger modulus, int dim, int index )
• protected BigInteger split( java.math.BigInteger sigma,
java.math.BigInteger domain )
• protected BigInteger twoHypercube( java.math.BigInteger[][]
query, java.math.BigInteger domain, java.math.BigInteger n2, int
index )
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
C.3.10 Class SternServer
Uses a BigInteger[] as the database, but implements the server side functionality
prescribed in the Stern Private Information Retrieval protocol.
Declaration
public class SternServer
extends edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
Constructor summary
SternServer() Creates a server object that contains the methods
required for the server in homomorphic encryption based private
information retrieval scheme.
Method summary
performRetrieval(BigInteger[], BigInteger)
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Constructors
• SternServer
public SternServer( )
– Description
Creates a server object that contains the methods required for the
server in homomorphic encryption based private information retrieval
scheme. To be used in conjunction with a SternClient.
Methods
• performRetrieval
public java.math.BigInteger performRetrieval(
java.math.BigInteger[] query, java.math.BigInteger domain )
Members inherited from class
edu.rit.local.simple.server.BigIntegerServer (in C.3.2, page 136)
• protected dataSize
• protected db
• protected dbSize
• protected dimLength
• public int getDatabaseDimensions( )
• public int getDatabaseSize( )
• public int getDataSize( )
• public int getDimensionLength( )
• public int getMaxExponent( )
• public int getNumberOfSplits( )
• protected maxExp
• protected numDim
• protected numSplits
• public void setDatabase( java.math.BigInteger[] db )
Appendix D
Scripts
D.1 Stern Experiment Script
#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Stern
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote .
s e r v e r . ServerImpl $K 1024 0 &
s l e ep 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $j$K$c
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t .
remote . c l i e n t . C l i en t l o c a l h o s t
$r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir Stern$K
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mv ∗ . l og Stern$K / .
l e t K=$K∗10
done
exit 0
D.2 Chang Experiment Script
#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Chang
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 1 $c &
s l e ep 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $j$K$c
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir Chang$K$c
mv ∗ . l og Chang$K$c / .
l e t c=$c+1
done
l e t K=$K∗10
done
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exit 0
D.3 Pre-Split Experiment Script
#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Pre−S p l i t
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 5 $c &
s l e ep 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $ j
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir PreSpl it$K$c
mv ∗ . l og PreSpl it$K$c / .
l e t c=$c+1
done
l e t K=$K∗10
done
exit 0
D.4 Extended Experiment Script
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#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Extended
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
s=1
while [ $s − l e 4 ] ; do
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 3 $c $s &
s l e e p 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $ j
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir Extended$K$c$s
mv ∗ . l og Extended$K$c$s / .
l e t s=$s+1
done
l e t c=$c+1
done
l e t K=$K∗10
done
exit 0
D.5 Generalized Experiment Script
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#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Genera l i zed
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
s=1
while [ $s − l e 4 ] ; do
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 4 $c 2 $s &
s l e e p 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $ j
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir General ized$K$c$s
mv ∗ . l og General ized$K$c$s / .
l e t s=$s+1
done
l e t c=$c+1
done
l e t K=$K∗10
done
exit 0
D.6 Lipmaa Experiment Script
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#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Lipmaa
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
s=1
while [ $s − l e 4 ] ; do
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 2 $c $s &
s l e e p 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $ j
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir Lipmaa$K$c$s
mv ∗ . l og Lipmaa$K$c$s / .
l e t s=$s+1
done
l e t c=$c+1
done
l e t K=$K∗10
done
exit 0
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D.7 Lipmaa versus Collaboration Experiment
Script
#!/ usr / b in / bash
#LipmaaVCollab
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
s=1
while [ $s − l e 4 ] ; do
l e t exp=2∗∗$s+1
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 2 $c $exp &
s l e ep 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $ j
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir LipmaaVCollab$K$c$s
mv ∗ . l og LipmaaVCollab$K$c$s / .
l e t s=$s+1
done
l e t c=$c+1
done
l e t K=$K∗10
done
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exit 0
D.8 Collaboration Experiment Script
#!/ usr / b in / bash
#Col lab
K=10
while [ $K − l e 100 ] ; do
c=2
while [ $c − l e 4 ] ; do
s=1
while [ $s − l e 4 ] ; do
l e t exp=2∗∗$s+1
echo exp$exp
#Sta r t the s e r v e r
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . s e r v e r .
ServerImpl $K 1024 6 $c $exp &
s l e ep 10
#Run the c l i e n t s
j=1
while [ $ j − l e 20 ] ; do
echo $ j
l e t r=$RANDOM%$K
java −cp . . / . . / t h e s i s / . edu . r i t . remote . c l i e n t .
C l i en t l o c a l h o s t $r
l e t j=$ j+1
done
#Ki l l the curren t s e r v e r
pid=‘pgrep java ‘
k i l l $pid
#Move ∗ . l o g f i l e s to another d i r e c t o r y
mkdir Collab$K$c$s
mv ∗ . l og Collab$K$c$s / .
l e t s=$s+1
done
l e t c=$c+1
done
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l e t K=$K∗10
done
exit 0
D.9 Result Collection Script
#!/ bin / bash
#Thesis Resu l t s Co l l e c t i on
topDirs=‘ l s ‘
echo $topDirs
for top in $topDirs
do
i f [ $top != Thes i sResu l t s . sh ] ; then
cd $top
echo top : ‘pwd‘
subDirs=‘ l s ‘
for sub in $subDirs
do
l e t query=0
queryMin=9999999999
queryMax=0
ex t r a c t i on=0
extract ionMin=9999999999
extractionMax=0
i f [ $sub != Local$top . sh ] ; then
echo $sub
cd $sub
rm Resu l t s . txt
echo sub : ‘pwd‘
f i l e s =‘ l s C l i en t ∗ . log ‘
for INFILE in $ f i l e s
do
echo $INFILE
l i n e s =‘wc − l $INFILE ‘
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exec < $INFILE
#Skip to t h i r d l i n e
read LINE
read LINE
#Get query time
read LINE
f i r s t=$LINE
read LINE
second=$LINE
i f [ $ f i r s t −ge $second ] ; then
l e t second=$second+86400000
f i
l e t d i f f=$second−$ f i r s t
l e t query=$query+$ d i f f
i f [ $ d i f f −ge $queryMax ] ; then
queryMax=$ d i f f
f i
i f [ $ d i f f − l e $queryMin ] ; then
queryMin=$ d i f f
f i
#Get e x t r a c t i o n time
read LINE
f i r s t=$LINE
read LINE
second=$LINE
i f [ $ f i r s t −ge $second ] ; then
l e t second=$second+86400000
f i
l e t d i f f=$second−$ f i r s t
l e t e x t r a c t i on=$ex t r a c t i on+$ d i f f
i f [ $ d i f f −ge $extractionMax ] ; then
extractionMax=$ d i f f
f i
i f [ $ d i f f − l e $extract ionMin ] ; then
extract ionMin=$ d i f f
f i
done
echo $query
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INFILE=‘ l s Server ∗ . log ‘
echo $INFILE
l i n e s =‘wc − l $INFILE ‘
f i r s t L i n e s=0
proce s s=0
processMax=0
processMin=999999999
exec < $INFILE
while read LINE
do
i f [ $ f i r s t L i n e s = 0 ] ; then
echo Skip
#Skip to t h i r d l i n e
read LINE
read LINE
f i r s t L i n e s=1
f i
f i r s t=$LINE
read LINE
second=$LINE
i f [ $second − l e $ f i r s t ] ; then
l e t second=$second+86400000
f i
l e t d i f f=$second−$ f i r s t
l e t p roc e s s=$proce s s+$ d i f f
i f [ $ d i f f −ge $processMax ] ; then
processMax=$ d i f f
f i
i f [ $ d i f f − l e $processMin ] ; then
processMin=$ d i f f
f i
done
sampleSize=20
l e t p roce s s=$proce s s / $sampleSize
l e t query=$query/ $sampleSize
l e t e x t r a c t i on=$ex t r a c t i on / $sampleSize
echo $query > Resu l t s . txt
echo $queryMin >> Resu l t s . txt
170 APPENDIX D. SCRIPTS
echo $queryMax >> Resu l t s . txt
echo $proce s s >> Resu l t s . txt
echo $processMin >> Resu l t s . txt
echo $processMax >> Resu l t s . txt
echo $ex t r a c t i on >> Resu l t s . txt
echo $extract ionMin >> Resu l t s . txt
echo $extractionMax >> Resu l t s . txt
l e t totalAvg=$query+$ex t r a c t i on+$proce s s
echo $totalAvg >> Resu l t s . txt
cd . .
f i
done
cd . .
f i
done
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